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Collecting Data: How will the ESRB Overcome the First 
Hurdle towards Effective Macro-prudential Supervision?
ANAT KELLER*
Abstract
This article provides a critical assessment of the European Systemic Risk Board’s 
(‘ESRB’) data collection process and examines the likely effectiveness of the legal 
frameworks, mechanisms and structures set out to accommodate it. It presents the 
various sources from which the ESRB collects its data in order to produce, where 
necessary, concrete warnings and remedial recommendations regarding risks to the 
financial stability within the EU. The article then points to possible impediments 
to the smooth flow of information through these channels of information and sug-
gests ways to refine the data collection process. It further explores two pressing 
areas where information gaps are most apparent: shadow banking and systemati-
cally important institutions. It concludes that there are indeed various challenges 
and possible obstacles to smooth flow of information both in the legal frameworks 
and the practical mechanisms of the data collection process. Yet, the ESRB’s infor-
mation base and its data collection mandate are wide enough to tailor its macro-
prudential analysis needs and are far from being a duplicating effort of other 
national and international players.
1. Introduction 
In the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, bailing out plans and gloomy predictions 
as to the future of the euro zone, it is hardly surprising that the European Systemic 
Risk Board (the ‘ESRB) has been kept out of public eye and academic discussion. 
The ESRB was established in January 2011 and forms part of the European System 
of Financial Supervision (the ESFS).1 The ESFS is aimed at ensuring the supervi-
sion of the financial system in the EU and bringing together the actors of the 
* A PhD Candidate and a Teaching Fellow, University College of London. I would like to thank 
Iris Chiu, Arad Reisberg, Philip Rawlings and Miriam Goldby for their useful comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1 Council Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union Macro-prudential 
Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331/1 
(the “ESRB Regulation”); Council Regulation (EU) 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 on Conferring 
Specific Tasks upon the European Central Bank Concerning the Functioning of the European Systemic 
Risk Board [2010] OJ L 331/162 (the “ECB Regulation”). 
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financial supervision both at the national and at the EU level to act as a network.2 
At the EU level, this network comprises the ESRB and three newly established 
authorities: the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupa-
tional Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority (col-
lectively referred to as the ‘European Supervisory Authorities, hereinafter the 
‘ESAs’) and the Joint Committee of the ESAs.3 At the national level, the ESFS 
comprises the competent or supervisory authorities in the Member States as speci-
fied in the legislation establishing the ESAs.4 The ESRB is entrusted with the 
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the EU, contributing to 
the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability.5 Systemic risk 
is defined as a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.6
The borders of macro-prudential framework, as a separate policy from more “tra-
ditional” ones, such as monetary and fiscal policies and its policy tools sparked vast 
academic and policy debate in recent years.7 Complemented by technical work of 
developing tools to measure and analyse systemic risks, it seems that the research of 
macro-prudential supervision is put on the fast track.8 This Article is concerned with 
a much narrower area though its importance merits wider discussion: the collection 
of relevant data by the ESRB for macro-prudential supervision of the financial system 
2 The ESRB Regulation, Preamble para. 14. 
3 Council Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of 14 November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Com-
mission decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331/12 (the “EBA Regulation”); Council Regulation (EU) 
1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commis-
sion decision 2009/79/EC [2010] OJ L 331/48 (the “EIOPA Regulation”); Council Regulation (EU) 
1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securi-
ties and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L331/84 (the “ESMA Regulation”); The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regula-
tion and the ESMA Regulation are together referred to as the “ESAs Regulations”, Arts 2 and 54–57, 
respectively.
4 The ESRB Regulation Arts 2–3; The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA 
Regulation, Arts 2(2)(f), respectively. 
5 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 3(1).
6 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 2(c). On the nature of systemic risks see e.g., ECB, ‘The Financial 
Stability Review’ (June 2010), 141 <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201006en.
pdf> accessed 10 November 2011
7 As well as on the interaction between macro-prudential policy and other more “traditional” poli-
cies, such as monetary and fiscal policies. For a comprehensive overview of the academic and policy 
literature on the macro aspect of financial regulation see, for instance, Gabriele Galati and Richhild 
Moessner, Macro-prudential Policy – A Literature Review (2011) BIS Working Papers No 337) < http://
www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. 
8 Forecasting Financial Crises (FFC) is a three-year scientific project funded by the European 
Commission working on understanding and possibly forecasting systemic risk and global financial 
instabilities, see http://www.focproject.net. Another European project is the research network of Macro-
prudential Regulation and Supervision (MaRs) which is aimed at developing analytical instruments for 
macro-prudential oversight.
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within the EU. Collection of all the relevant and necessary data is a precondition to 
effective macro-prudential oversight and therefore requires a careful consideration. 
The Article examines the strengths and weaknesses of the exchange of information 
process in this context and assesses the likely effectiveness of the legal frameworks, 
mechanisms and structures set out to accommodate it. The conclusions drawn in this 
Article could guide policy-making intended to establish a reliable macro-prudential 
supervisory system in the EU. 
2. Legal Framework of Data Collection – A Critical Assessment
Establishing a legal framework in this area and efficient mechanisms by which this 
legal framework is converted into action is a complex and multi-faceted undertak-
ing. Four main reasons can be offered to explain this complexity. 
First, following the 2007–2008 financial crisis there is a wide consensus on the 
need for macro-prudential supervision. Yet, there is no commonly-agreed definition 
of macro-prudential supervision, its effects are largely untested and the borders with 
micro-prudential supervision are not fully defined. In addition, the development of 
macro-prudential analysis is still in its infancy and, therefore, there is no single 
approach to measure and assess systemic risks, which is necessarily exclusive or 
exhaustive. This means that data requirements of the ESRB will vary depending on 
the type of approach it utilises to identify and analyse the collected data. Initially, it 
is unlikely that a single approach will be taken to measure and analyse the collected 
data and accordingly data requirements will remain, in the short term, fluid and some-
what generic.9 The lack of a clear working frame for the ESRB suggests that there 
could be dangerous uncertainty in the exchange of information process, at least in its 
initial stages.10 
Secondly, issues concerning data collection process by the ESRB arise within a 
broad contextual background. The ESRB’s mandate covers wide range of areas, from 
the financial situation of banks, insurance companies and Alternative Investment 
Funds to the potential existence of asset bubbles or the good functioning of the mar-
ket infrastructures. The cross-sectoral nature of systemic risks necessitates a wide 
9 The decision which data is needed will be made according to the chosen approach/es to measur-
ing systemic risks. For instance, if a network approach is taken then the focus will be on mapping the 
interlinkages between financial institutions which require, among others, data about interbank loans, 
including cross-border exposures as well as information on credit risk transfer. See Deloitte & Tou-
che and Securities Industry and Financial Market Association, Systemic Risk Information Study (June 
2010) <http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/newsroom/2010/sifma_systemic_risk_information_study_
june_2010.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; Peter Praet, Macro-prudential and Financial Stability 
Statistics to Improve Financial Analysis of Exposures and Risk Transfers (Fifth ECB Conference on 
Statistics, Frankfurt, 22–23 April 2010) <http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/stats_conf/101019_
session1_praet.pdf?cb47c7de3b5bc869191a3bb5c9e411b9> accessed 10 November 2011. 
10 The first 5 years of its operation, in line with the time of the review of the ESRB mission and 
organisation according to Art. 20 of the ESRB Regulation.
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mandate for the ESRB. However, this overreaching surveillance radar creates further 
challenges. The legal frameworks that allow the sharing of information with the ESRB 
and the reporting requirements differ from one sector to another and, therefore, at 
least until harmonisation is reached, the data collected and the manner it is collected 
across various sectors will differ as well. These result, for instance, in lack of data 
comparability and, naturally, will be an impediment for an efficient macro-prudential 
analysis. 
Thirdly, the process of data collection in this area is, by its very nature, an evolv-
ing process and the ESRB data needs will be constantly revaluated and adjusted. The 
fast moving and opaque nature of financial markets and the search for less or non-
regulated areas which may pose systemic risks to the financial stability dictate the 
dynamic nature of data collection. Accordingly, there is a tension within the legal 
framework between the need, on the one hand, to cast the net wide to allow for these 
adjustments and the need to be specific to tailor the technical requirements in this 
area.
Finally, the ESRB is part of a complex and delicate institutional environment. 
Complex – since it involves newly established institutions at the EU level as well as 
long-standing actors of financial supervision at the national and international level 
and other exiting frameworks for information exchange.11 Diagram A below sets out 
the institutional environment in this area and conveys its complexity; Delicate – since 
the data collection process involves issues of confidentiality and general willingness 
(or unwillingness) of supervisors within and outside the EU to cooperate with the 
ESRB and disclose information. A successful data collection entails therefore the 
establishment of open channels between the ESRB and these institutions whereby 
information can be exchanged smoothly without any legal or practical obstacles. 
Much will depend on the cooperation of these institutions with the ESRB, their will-
ingness to establish defined legal frameworks and to follow them on in practice.
This Article focuses on these channels of information and the functioning of the 
ESRB as a central hub, pooling data from various sources and connecting them to 
create a constantly changing systemic risk map within the EU. It examines the legal 
frameworks and the practical mechanisms within which these channels operate. Fol-
lowing this introduction, section 2 outlines the legal framework empowering the 
ESRB to collect the information needed to prevent or mitigate systemic risks to finan-
cial stability. It provides a critical assessment of this legal framework; identifies pos-
sible obstacles to the smooth flow of information and suggests ways to refine the data 
collection process. Section 3 sketches out the essential features of the information 
that the ESRB should collect in order to fulfil its mission successfully. Section 4 
presents the various sources from which the ESRB collects its data and points to pos-
sible impediments to the smooth flow of information with each one of them. It sug-
gests that the ESRB uses a wide information base which equips it to create a unified 
and clear jigsaw puzzle of the financial system in the EU and its emerging risks. Sec-
tion 5 focuses on two pressing areas where information gaps are most apparent: the 
11 Such as colleges of supervisors, see section 4 below on pp 33–34. 
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shadow banking and systematically important institutions. Section 6 identifies the 
main difficulties in the systemic risk analysis stage that have a direct impact on the 
data collection process. Finally, section 7 draws the conclusion that the ESRB is far 
from being a duplicating effort of existing players in the regional and international 
level. Indeed, the ESRB relies on available information already being collected by 
central banks and other international institutions. However, it offers data collection 
process which is tailored to the European environment and complies with macro-
prudential analysis needs and to some extent, with the quality requirements of such 
data. 
Diagram A
The ESRB’s Task to Collect All Relevant and Necessary Data
The importance of availability of all the relevant information required to identify 
macro-prudential risks is emphasised in the de Larosière Report and numerous 
other reports that followed the financial crisis.12 Reflecting this, one of the tasks of 
the ESRB under Art. 3(2) of the ESRB Regulation is:
to determine and/or collect and analyse all relevant and necessary information 
for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union in 
order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial 
stability in the Union arising from developments within the financial system, tak-
12 The European Commission, The Report of the High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU (February 2009) (hereinafter “the de Larosière Report”); FSB and IMF, The Financial Crisis and 
Information Gaps (Washington D.C., October 2009)
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; FSB and IMF, 
The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps, Implementation Progress Report (June 2011) <http://www.
imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/063011.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
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ing into account macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods of wide-
spread financial distress. It shall contribute to the smooth functioning of the 
internal market and thereby ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial 
sector to economic growth.
Article 15 entrusts the ESRB with the powers to perform this task. Art. 15(2) pro-
vides that the European Supervisory Authorities (the ESAs), the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), the Commission, the national supervisory authorities and 
national statistics authorities shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and shall pro-
vide it with all the information necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks in accor-
dance with EU legislation. 
According to Art. 15(3) the ESRB may request information from the ESAs, as a 
rule, in summary or aggregate form such that individual financial institutions cannot 
be identified.13 However, before requesting this information, the ESRB has first to 
take account of the existing statistics produced, disseminated and developed by the 
European Statistical System (ESS) and the ESCB.14 The order of these subsections is 
somewhat cumbersome as the order by which the ESRB will receive the necessary 
information is first conducted under Art. 15(4) of the ESRB Regulation and only then 
under Art. 15(3). 
If the requested information is not available or is not available in a timely manner 
the ESRB may request it from the ESCB, the national supervisory authorities or the 
national statistics authorities and if the information remains unavailable the ESRB 
may request the information from the Member State concerned.15
Articles 15(6) and 15(7) deal with a reasoned request for information, which is not 
in summary or aggregate form. Under these sections the ESRB is required to submit, 
after consulting with the relevant ESA, a justified and proportionate request, explain-
ing why the data is deemed to be systemically relevant and necessary, considering 
13 Subject to Art. 36(2) of the EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA Regulation, 
respectively. 
14 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 15(4).
The European Statistical System (hereinafter the ESS) is the partnership between the Community 
Statistical Authority (referred to as ‘the Commission (Eurostat)’), the national statistical institutes and 
other national authorities responsible in each Member State for the development, production and dis-
semination of European statistics. See Council Regulation (EC) 223/2009 on European Statistics and 
repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 on the Transmission of Data subject to Statistical 
Confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities, Council Regulation (EC) No 
322/97 on Community Statistics, and Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom establishing a Committee 
on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities [2009] OJ L 87, which consolidated the 
activities of the ESS and improved its governance. It is to be noted that European statistics is developed, 
produced and disseminated by both the ESS and the ESCB under separate legal frameworks. For the lat-
ter, see Council Regulation (EC) 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the Collection of Statistical 
Information by the European Central Bank [1998] OJ L 318, p 8, as amended.
15 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 15(5). The reference here is to ‘the requested information”, it is to be 
assumed that this means the requested information from the ESAs, following consideration of existing 
statistics, under Arts 15(3) and 15(4) of the ESRB Regulation.
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the prevailing market situation. The Article does not state clearly whether the ESRB 
will submit the request to the addressee directly (individual financial institutions) or 
via the ESA or the national supervisors. The procedure here is important and extends 
beyond technicality. On the one hand, in cases where national supervisors do not have 
the required information on individual financial institutions it will be more efficient 
for the ESRB to be able to obtain the information directly from the institutions. On 
the other hand, the ESRB does not have a legal personality16 and this could stand as 
an obstacle for requesting the information directly from the individual financial insti-
tutions. On balance and considering the sensitivity of abstaining non-aggregate infor-
mation on individual financial institutions, it is suggested that collection should be 
made via the ESAs. This will be in line with the collection of aggregate information 
on an ad hoc basis which targets minimum interaction with reporting agents.17
If the relevant ESA does not consider the request to be justified and proportionate, 
it will send the request back to the ESRB and ask for additional justification. Article 
15(6), however, does not clarify what will be the procedure in case the additional 
justification provided by the ESRB does not convince the relevant ESA that the 
request is justified and proportionate.18
There are further essential issues concerning collection and exchange of informa-
tion that were overlooked in Art. 15. Even though the ESRB Regulation acknowledges 
the importance of cooperation with international institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), as well as other rel-
evant bodies in third countries,19 Art. 15 does not include any provision regarding 
exchange of information with these institutions. Furthermore, neither Art. 15 of the 
ESRB Regulation nor Art. 35 of the EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the 
ESMA Regulation, respectively, specifies any method whereby the rights of access 
to information may be enforced or any procedure whereby disagreements are to be 
resolved.20 
16 The ESRB was established on the basis of Art. 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) [2010] OJ C 83/47. See also the ESRB Regulation, Preamble, para. 15. This is to be 
contrasted with the ESAs that have separate personality, see, for instance, the EBA Regulation, Art. 5.
17 See n 30 below the Decision of the ESRB of 21 September 2011 on the Provision and Collection 
of Information for the Macro-prudential Oversight of the Financial System within the Union, Part B Art. 
3. The Decision does not define ‘reporting agents’ however referring to the Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2533/98 concerning the Collection of Statistical Information by the European Central Bank (1998) 
OJ L 318 this will include individual financial institutions under discussion here. 
This is to be contrasted with the position in the U.S. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Public Law No 111 – 203 enacted on July 21, 2010) established the Office of 
Financial Research (OFR) (section 512) to support the Financial Stability Oversight Council (The ESRB 
equivalent in the U.S.) inter alia by requesting data directly from firms by subpoena (section 153(f)). 
18 This aspect of requesting information in a non-aggregate form will be further explored in section 
3 of this Article.
19 The ESRB Regulation, Preamble para. 7 and Art. 3(2)(i).
20 Interestingly, a provision referring to the enforcement of the ESRB rights to collect information 
was suggested in the European Parliament’s Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Community Macro-prudential Oversight of the Financial System 
and Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board 2009/0140 (COD), amendment 79 proposing a new 
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Confidentiality
The constraints to the right to access information can be found in Art. 8 of the 
ESRB Regulation, which sets out confidentiality obligations. Article 8(1) provides 
the general prohibition and requires the Members of the General Board and any 
other persons who work or who have worked for or in connection with the ESRB 
not to disclose information that is subject to professional secrecy, even after their 
duties have ceased. The information received by members of the ESRB can be used 
only in the course of their duties and in performing the tasks as set out in Art. 3(2) 
of the ESRB Regulation.21 This provision is essential given the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) role in ensuring the ESRB Secretariat and the reliance on its 
resources, on the one hand and the need to ensure that the independence of the 
ESRB and the ECB is preserved, on the other hand.22 In practical terms, it implies 
the establishment of a chinese wall between the ESRB and the ECB and, to this 
end, internal rules were established, as prescribed in Art. 6(3) of the ECB Regula-
tion.23 These rules will ensure that the support provided by the ECB to the ESRB 
is conducted without prejudice to the principle of independence of the ECB in the 
performance of its tasks pursuant to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (hereinafter: the ‘Treaty’).24
Finally, to prevent identification of individual financial institutions, confidential 
information obtained while performing the ESRB tasks cannot be divulged to any 
person or authority whatsoever, except in summary or aggregate form.25 This sweep-
ing restriction may clash with Arts 15(6)–(7), which allow, under certain conditions, 
disclosure of information that is not in summary or aggregate form. It may restrict 
the ability of the ESRB to address appropriate warnings and recommendations to the 
paragraph 4a as follows: “If information referred to in this Article is not made available or in the event 
of an emergency, the General Board may call on the European Parliament and the Council to act in 
an appropriate way.” This proposed amendment was not included in the final version of Art. 15 of the 
ESRB Regulation.
21 ESRB Regulation, Art. 8(2) and ECB Regulation, Art. 6(4). 
22 On the interaction and possible conflict between the monetary policy and macro-prudential policy 
see for instance, Alastair Clark and Andrew Large, Macroprudential Policy: Addressing the Things We 
Don’t Know (Occasional Paper 83, Group of Thirty, Washington, DC, 2011)
23 According to Art. 22 of the Decision of the ESRB of 20 January 2011 adopting the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB/2011/1) OJ C 58/4, the ESRB Secretariat will 
classify and handle information and documents in accordance with the ECB internal rules and any sup-
plementary rules adopted by the ESRB/ECB for that matter. See the ECB Decision of 19 February 2004 
adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, ECb/2004/2, OJ L 080/33.
24 [2010] OJ C 83/47, Art. 282(3). See the ESRB Regulation, para. 6 of the preamble; the ECB 
Opinion of 26 October 2009 on a Proposal for the ESRB Regulation and the ECB Regulation (2009/C 
270/01) emphasising in para. 4 that the involvement of the ECB and ESCB in the ESRB will not alter 
the primary objective of the ESCB under Art. 105(1) of the Treaty, which is to maintain price stability 
and that its supporting activities for the ESRB will not affect the ECB’s institutional, functional and 
financial independence.
25 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 8(3). 
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relevant Member State, ESA or the national supervisory authority, where it identifies 
an individual institution as posing systemic risk for the financial system. 
In order to safeguard information regarding individual financial institutions and 
information from which individual financial institutions can be identified the ESRB, 
together with the ESAs, will agree on specific confidentiality procedures.26 Such an 
agreement between the ESRB and the ESAs was signed in November 2011 and is to 
be reviewed within a year by the parties.27 The agreement provides detailed proce-
dures on staff access to confidential information regarding individual financial insti-
tutions and the secured storage of that information. In particular, the agreement 
provides that the exchange of information between the parties will be done through 
a separate area in the ESRB’s electronic collaboration tool (DARWIN). The data 
stored on the DARWIN file is encrypted, with highly restricted access and even con-
tains an audit trail of all access.28 
Unfortunately, Art. 8 does not provide any indication of what are the consequences 
where there is a failure to comply with its prohibitions. In particular, unlike Art. 70(4) 
of the EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA Regulation, respec-
tively, it does not refer to Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom [2001] 
OJ L317/1 of 29 November 2001, which provides for security of EU classified infor-
mation. According to paragraph 24.3 of the Annex on the Rules on Security to this 
decision, any individual who is responsible for compromising EU classified informa-
tion will be subject to a disciplinary action, such as a written warning, downgrading 
or suspension.29 In order to ensure a strict safeguard of confidential information Art. 
8 should incorporate sanctions for breach of its provisions and refer to this decision 
in line with the ESAs Regulations. 
The Mechanism and Guiding Principles of the ESRB’s Data Collection Exercises
The mechanism and guiding principles of the ESRB’s data collection exercises are 
set out in the Decision of the ESRB of 21 September 2011 on the Provision and 
Collection of Information for the Macro-prudential Oversight of the Financial Sys-
tem within the Union (hereinafter: ‘the Decision’).30 The Decision outlines the 
26 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 8(4).
27 Agreement between the EBA, the EIOPA, the ESMA and the ESRB on the Establishment at 
the ESRB Secretariat of Specific Confidentiality Procedures in order to Safeguard Information regard-
ing Individual Financial Institutions and Information from which Individual Financial Institutions 
can be Identified, 25 November 2011. The agreement is available at <http://www.esrb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/111125_agreement_EBA_EIOPA_ESMA_ESRB.pdf?187795e45ccb8f122ed7fbcac125827e> 
accessed 10 November 2011.
28 Ibid., Art. 5.
29 According to the relevant rules and regulations, particularly title VI of the Staff Regulations of 
Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Union, as laid down in Regulation 259/68 (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) [1968] OJ L 56. The specific rules 
on disciplinary actions are set out in Annex IX of the Staff Regulations. 
30 ESRB/2011/6, OJ C 302/3.
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aggregated information required by the ESRB for the performance of its tasks and 
lays out detailed rules for the provision and collection of that information.31
The Decision is divided into two main sections: (i) regular provision of the aggre-
gated information required by the ESRB for the performance of it tasks and (ii) ad 
hoc provision of aggregated information. Thus, both ongoing data collection and ad 
hoc troubleshooting are provided as tools for the ESRB macro-prudential analysis. 
The provisions governing regular provision of the aggregated information by the ECB 
and by the respective ESAs are specified in Annexes I and II, respectively.32 The 
procedures that the ESRB Secretariat will apply to carry out requests for aggregated 
information on an ad hoc basis are prescribed in Annex III.33
Annex I lists published and non-published datasets that the ECB reports for the 
eurozone in the area of monetary and financial statistics.34 The datasets include, for 
instance, the Consolidated Banking Data, which covers data on balance sheet, profit 
and loss account and solvency of banking groups on an aggregated basis.35 With 
regard to non-eurozone Member States, the Decision mentions briefly that the ECB 
collects information solely on a voluntary basis with the approval of the relevant 
national central banks. This gap is unsatisfactory and is further exacerbated by the 
criticism that the ESRB governance does not represent non-eurozone countries suf-
ficiently.36 To ensure that all relevant information on non-eurozone countries is avail-
able to the ESRB the information gap should ideally be remedied but in practical 
terms this may not feasible. Legal acts and instruments of the ECB, defining the actual 
reporting population and its reporting requirements, are directly applicable and bind-
ing in the euro area alone.37 Their implementation in the non-euro area is achieved 
on a voluntary basis mostly in the context of preparation for entry into the euro area.38 
This incentive does not exist for Members States, such as the UK, that do not wish 
to join the eurozone. The ECB should, therefore, aim at promoting voluntary imple-
mentation of its reporting requirements and a statement in this spirit should be 
included in the Decision. This suggestion is in line with Art. 5 of the ESCB Statute39 
31 The Decision, Art. 1.
32 The Decision, Arts 2(2)-2(3).
33 The Decision, Art. 3.
34 The content, frequency and timeliness of these datasets are regulated either by the legal acts 
referred to in annex I or as established in common practice.
35 The Decision, Annex I s 6. The Council Regulation (EC) No 951/2009 of 9 October 2009 amend-
ing Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European 
Central Bank OJ L 269/1, preamble, paras 3–4 reflects the ESCB macro-prudential statistics needs and 
enables the ECB to require information for financial stability purposes from the entire sector of financial 
corporations (in particular from insurance companies and pension funds). 
36 See, for instance, Williem Buiter, The Proposed European Systemic Risk Board is Overweight 
with Central Bankers (Williem Buiter’s Maverecon, FT.com, 28 October 2009) <http://blogs.ft.com/
mavercom> accessed 10 November 2011.
37 In the form of regulations or guidelines. 
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the Collection of Statisti-
cal Information by the European Central Bank, Preamble paras 14 and 17.
39 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p 68), as amended.
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that entrusts the ECB with the task of collecting statistical information and applies to 
all Member States, irrespective of their adoption of the euro and with Art. 15(4) of 
the ESRB Regulation that refers explicitly to the ESCB as the source of information. 
Annex II lists the aggregated information provided by the ESAs and ensures the 
protection of firm-level data and identification of specific institutions from the dis-
closed information. The general rule here is that the aggregated information will 
comprise data on at least three legal persons, none of which represents 85% or more 
of the relevant market, whether it consists of one or more Member States or the Union 
as a whole. However, if dispersion measures are disclosed to the ESRB in addition 
to the aggregated information, the information is more granular.40 In that case, the 
aggregated information will comprise data on at least five legal persons when refer-
ring to publicly available data and on at least six legal persons when there is a need 
to protect confidential firm-level data. These specific granularity restrictions are con-
trasted with the flexible granularity restrictions of information collected via ad hoc 
surveys under Annex III. Annex III does not prescribe a rule of thumb for the granu-
larity of the information collected for the purpose of these surveys but rather relies 
on the decision of the ESRB General Board that may determine the granularity on an 
institutional and item level. This mechanism is welcomed and will allow the ESRB 
to access more granular information in times of financial crisis on an ad hoc basis. It 
should be considered though whether the Decision should have put in place a mech-
anism to allow adjustments in the granularity of information in times of crisis under 
the regular pooling of information in Annex II as well. For instance, the Decision can 
provide that the ESRB General Board may decide that more granular information is 
needed in the regular provision of aggregated information by the ESAs, considering 
the prevailing market situation. 
Specific sections on provision of information by each one of the ESAs follow the 
granularity restrictions in Annex II. The EBA is required to report datasets for a 
sample of large banking groups as defined together with the ESRB.41 The information 
will be transmitted to the ESRB quarterly, 5 working days following the EBA’s 
receipt of data from the National Supervisory Authorities (the NSAs).42 This is quite 
an impressive time span, in particular when contrasting it with the one year time span 
of information provided by the EIOPA.43 It can be further observed that the Decision 
assumes that specific but material agreements regarding regular provision of informa-
tion between the ESRB and the EBA are to be followed. Accordingly, the date of the 
first transmission of information is left to be agreed between the ESRB and the EBA 
with no specific time frame prescribed for such an agreement to be reached. The 
definition of a large banking group is again subject to an agreement between the ESRB 
and the EBA and the Decision does not provide the considerations that should be 
40 Dispersion measures are not defined in the Decision. Measures of dispersion are the quantities 
that characterise the ‘spread’ of the data (Unesco.org).
41 These datasets include data from COREP and FINREP templates, data on liquidity and data from 
the EBA common reporting of large exposures templates (Annex II, paras A1-A3).
42 Which occurs 90 days after the reference date. 
43 It remains to be seen if this will be adhered to in practice. 
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taken into account44 or how often the list of these groups will need to be revaluated. 
The flexible nature of the Decision is understandable considering the fast changing 
data needs of the ESRB however this is subject to reaching concrete agreements with 
time frames and revaluation targets.
Lastly, the Decision provides that no historical information is required from the 
EBA. This is surprising, particularly when contrasting it with the information to be 
provided by the EIOPA, which goes back to 2003 and from the ESMA, which goes 
back to 2007. Collecting historical information is essential for macro-prudential 
analysis due to the time dimension of systemic risks, ie the need to evaluate how these 
risks in the financial system evolve over time.45 Therefore, it is to be regretted that 
the ESRB failed to incorporate this requirement in the banking area as well.
The subsequent section in Annex II lays out the datasets that the EIOPA will report 
to the ESRB. In contrast with the requirements applicable to the EBA, the informa-
tion here will be disclosed on an annual basis however it will include datasets which 
refer not only to large Union insurance companies as identified by EIOPA but to all 
Union insurance companies. The last section lists the datasets that will be provided 
by the ESMA, collected in cooperation with the NSAs and transmitted on a quarterly 
basis. 
Annex III specifies the conditions under which the ESRB may request aggregated 
information to be provided on an ad hoc basis. The procedure aims at avoiding dupli-
cation of efforts and therefore initial ad hoc requests for aggregated information 
submitted by the ESRB will generally first trigger an investigation phase.46 This phase, 
organised by the Secretariat with the support of the ECB, will identify whether an ad 
hoc survey needs to be carried out.47 In particular, it will assess what quantitative and 
qualitative data are already available (from the ESCB, the ESAs, commercial data 
providers or international organisations) and whether they are fit for purpose. The 
Decision does not define the term ‘fit for purpose’ or refer to other document for 
guidance. It is submitted in section 3 below that the term should be interpreted widely 
to include not only data that meets the ESRB objectives as set out in Art. 2 of the 
ESRB Regulation. It should encompass data that meets the expectations of the key 
44 Balancing the need to minimise reporting burden and avoid the exclusion of relevant groups from 
the reporting obligations. 
45 The source of system-wide financial distress in the time dimension is the procyclicality of the 
financial system. The time dimension complements the cross-sectional dimension (dealing with how risk 
is allocated with the financial system at a point in time). In the cross-sectional dimension, the sources of 
risk are the common exposures and interlinkages in the financial system. See Jaime Caruana, Systemic 
Risk: How to Deal with It? (BIS, 12 February 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp08.htm> accessed 
10 November 2011; Claudio Borio, Rediscovering Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: 
Journey, Challenges and a Way Forward (2011) BIS Working Papers No 354 <http://www.bis.org/publ/
work354.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
46 The Decision, Annex III, para. 1.2. 
47 The Decision, Annex III, para. 4.1. In case the ESRB and one or more ESAs agree, due to their 
common interest in a specific topic, to launch a joint ad hoc survey, an investigation phase will be 
unnecessary, The Decision, Annex III, para. 1.3.
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stakeholders, such as the various data sources through which data is transferred to the 
ESRB and the reporting agents from which data is being collected, as well. 
Where the data is not available or not fit for purpose and there is need for the data 
to be collected from reporting agents through an ad hoc survey, the investigation phase 
may identify the relevant reporting population and broad cost implications for the 
reporting agents in carrying out such a survey. The outcome of the investigation phase 
may entail the adoption of a decision by the ESRB’s General Board for aggregated 
information to be collected via an ad hoc survey.48 In deciding whether an ad hoc 
survey is needed, the ESRB’s General Board will be informed of and will take into 
account the likely costs involved and the timetable for conducting such a survey.49 Its 
decision may determine the granularity of the required information on an institutional 
and item level, the confidentiality regime to be applied, in particular who will be 
allowed to access which data and how data will be stored and transmitted and the time 
limits for provision of the information.50
Once it is determined that an ad hoc survey is necessary, following an investiga-
tion phase, the Decision distinguishes between two types of surveys that may be used.51 
Type 1 surveys focuses on specific issues and usually aims to provide more detailed 
breakdowns within regular data collection exercises. These surveys may also cover 
datasets that give rise to (regular) data collection in a different context or by a differ-
ent organisation, such as the IMF or the Bank of International Settlements (the BIS), 
and for which established methodological frameworks already exist. Type 2 surveys 
cover phenomena not previously analysed and for which no methodology has been 
established and no regular data collection is carried out. Type 2 is more time consum-
ing and the information extracted from it may be more difficult to interpret in the 
process of systemic risk analysis.52 The surveys can be conducted either by the rel-
evant ESA or by the ESCB, in accordance with the ECB assessment following the 
investigation stage.53 The data collection phase is illustrated in Diagram B striving to 
capture the detailed process in section 4 of the Decision.54
Finally, section 3 of Annex III outlines the principles that the ESRB Secretariat, 
the ECB and the ESAs will have to adhere to when fulfilling ad hoc information 
requests. These principles will ensure the necessary information will flow efficiently 
within confidentiality constraints. The principles are: (a) follow agreed procedural 
steps, which should be applied in transparent manner;55 (b) avoid excessive interac-
48 The Decision, Annex III, paras 2.1 and 4.1.
49 The Decision, Annex III, para. 2.2.
50 The detailed procedure for the investigation phase and the data collection phase is outlined in 
section 4 of the Decision and is illustrated in Diagram B below.
51 The Decision, Annex III, para. 2.1.
52 Following the completion of an ad hoc survey the Decision provides for a quality check mecha-
nism with a view to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of future surveys, The Decision, Annex 
III para. 4.2.4.
53 The Decision, Annex III, paras 4.1.3.
54 The Decision, Annex III, paras 4.2.2–4.2.3.
55 For instance, the agreement between the ESRB and the ESAs on confidentiality procedures, see 
section 2 above on p 10.
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tion with reporting agents; (c) maximise the use of existing information for various 
analytical and operational purposes, while respecting the necessary legal constraints 
and confidentiality safeguards; (d) use existing, to the extent possible harmonised, 
methodologies and data collections as much as possible; (e) develop best practices 
for ad hoc surveys by introducing feedback mechanisms and sharing information on 
methodologies among all parties involved.
It is interesting that the principles include neither requirements for the parties to 
endeavour to collect timely, accurate and comparable information nor a requirement 
for revaluation of the ESRB micro-prudential data needs. These essential features of 
the collected data and others are the subject of the next section.
3. Which Data Should be Collected by the ESRB?
The previous section outlined and evaluated the legal framework set out for the 
ESRB’s data collection process. Yet, ensuring a strong legal framework that allows 
smooth flow of all relevant and necessary information for effective macro-pruden-
tial supervision does not guarantee the quality of that information. This section, 
therefore, set forth the main quality principles and elements that should guide the 
ESRB data collection and support effective conduct of macro-prudential supervi-
sion.56 Generally, the data collected by the ESRB should be comprehensive but not 
overpowering, comparable, timely but accurate. In addition, the process of collect-
ing the data should be an evolving process which preserves legal constraints of 
confidentiality.57 These principles and elements can provide a benchmark for the 
ESRB staff in collecting and compiling data as well as enhance the credibility of 
the ESRB data analysis and policy decisions. 
Is there an Existing Data Quality Framework to Rely upon?
There are numerous international and European frameworks which set out the main 
quality principles and elements guiding the production of data. These include the 
ECB’s Statistic Quality Framework (the “ECB SQF”) and the IMF’s Data Quality 
Assessment Framework (the “IMF DQAF”).58 Deviations with respect to the precise 
content of the principles has been made here to reflect the different institutional 
setting and governance structure of the ESRB, the complex environment from 
56 The reference here to data collection includes the process of collecting the data as well as the 
output (i.e. the collected data).
57 See the ECB Statistics Quality Framework (hereinafter: ‘the ECB SQF’) <http://www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/other/ecbstatisticsqualityframework200804en.pdf?21693e3edb0c4c0379e1d1ff5907f797> accessed 
10 November 2011. 
58 Ibid., the IMF’s Data Quality Assessment Framework <http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/dqrs/
dqrsdqaf> accessed 10 November 2011. See also the European Statistics Code of Practice <http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/quality/code_of_practice> accessed 10 November 2011.
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which data is being collected and the wide ranging areas on which data is being 
collected.59 It is highly regrettable that no specific reference to any of these frame-
works was incorporated in the Decision and that the principles that are set out in 
the Decision for ad hoc surveys data collection are not fully aligned with European 
or international standards regarding data quality.60 Moreover, in the absence of 
guiding principles to be applied, quality assurance procedures, adjusted to the 
ESRB data collection process, cannot be laid out and followed. Given that data 
collection is one of the core tasks of the ESRB, it is suggested that this gap be 
rectified, either by amending the Decision and incorporating a reference to a data 
quality framework61 or by setting specific principles and quality assurance proce-
dures in a separate document which will form the ESRB’ statement of intent in this 
area. The latter option is advisable since it will be tailored to the ESRB objectives 
and tasks.62 For instance, the second principle of the ECB SQF requires a clear 
mandate for data collection, including the power to impose sanctions on reporting 
agents which fail to comply with their obligations. This requirement does not fit 
the governance of the ESRB that is based on ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.63 
The outline of the essential principles and elements of high quality data in this 
context is subject to three important preliminary considerations. First, the ability of 
the ESRB to collect high quality data and analyse it depends on the availability of 
sufficient resources.64 The ESRB Regulation does not prescribe a procedure for the 
establishment of the budget in contrast with the detailed procedure prescribed in the 
ESAs Regulations.65 It is suggested, therefore, that the adequacy of costs should be 
monitored carefully and taken into account in the review of the ESRB mission and 
organisation, scheduled to take place in 2013.66 Secondly, the quality of the ESRB 
data depends on the inputs received from various sources (such as, the ESAs and 
commercial data providers) as well as on the ESRB internal data collection process. 
This section focuses on the ESRB internal process, though the ESRB has a role in 
creating preconditions for high quality inputs from the various data sources. Ensuring 
these preconditions are in place and allow effective exchange of information is the 
subject of section 4. 
Thirdly, the various quality principles are not necessarily confined to data collec-
tion activities, such as the principles requiring independence and accountability, 
59 Section 4 of this Article will outline the various data sources and the unique challenges they 
present in the data collection process.
60 For the principles for ad hoc survey data collection set in the Decision see section 2 above on 
pp 15–16.
61 It is suggested that the European Statistic Code of Practice or the IMF DQAF are more suitable 
here than the ECB SQF due to their generic application. 
62 As laid down in Art. 2 of the ESRB Regulation.
63 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 17.
64 The ECB SQF, Principle 6.
65 Arts 62–63 of the EBA Regulation. According to the ESRB Annual Report 2011, p 17 the direct 
costs amounted to €7.1 million, to which indirect costs relating to other support services shared with 
the ECB, such as human resources, IT and general administration, have to be added.
66 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 20.
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impartiality and objectivity.67 These general principles have been ensured, though not 
without criticism in the ESRB Regulation and can be applied to the ESRB’ operation 
in the context of data collection as well.68
The Meaning of ‘High Quality’ Data
In order to lay out the main quality principles and elements guiding rigorous macro-
prudential data collection it is vital to define ‘quality’. This is not an easy task as 
quality is inherently a subjective notion.69 In statistics, high quality can be tested 
by asking whether the collected data and the collection process are fit for purpose.70 
It is submitted that fit for purpose in the context of the ESRB data collection is not 
limited to fulfilling the ESRB objectives as set out in Art. 2 of the ESRB Regula-
tion. It is a much wider concept interpreted to encompass how well the expectations 
of the key stakeholders are fulfilled. The key stakeholders in this context should 
not be confined to the internal users within the ESRB that are involved in the data 
collection process. It should be interpreted to include ‘outsiders’, such as the vari-
ous data sources through which data is being transferred to the ESRB and reporting 
agents from which data is being collected.71 Accordingly, safeguarding confidenti-
ality and minimising burden on reporting agents form part of the principles outlined 
below.
Comprehensive but not Excessive
It is clearly vital that the ESRB will collect all the relevant information to identify 
systemic risks to financial stability however it needs to avoid the pitfall of collect-
ing too much information. 
First, “over collecting” information may result in missing the forest for the trees 
and will become non-effective method of collection of information. 
Secondly, a cost-effective approach should be taken to avoid duplication of efforts, 
since existing statistics are already being collected by the ESS and by the ESCB. 
Indeed, as discussed in section 2 above, the ESRB Regulation provides that the mea-
sures of collection of information should be taken without prejudice to the legal 
67 For instance, The ECB SQF, Principles 3 and 4.
68 On the governance of the ESRB see Ch. 2 of the ESRB Regulation and in particular Art. 4–5 of 
the ESRB Regulation; On impartiality requirement see Art. 7 of the ESRB Regulation; On accountability 
see Art. 19 of the ESRB Regulation. For criticism on the governance and accountability arrangement 
of the ESRB see Miriam Goldby and Anat Keller, The Commission’s Proposal for an New European 
Systemic Risk Board: An Evaluation 4 Law and Financial Markets Review 48–57 (2010). 
69 The ECB SQF, para. 2.1. 
70 This term has been used in the Decision in determining the need to conduct an ad hoc survey. 
It is to be noted the ECB SQF refers to the quality in the context of the institutional environment, the 
statistical processes and the statistical outputs. 
71 For the various data sources (such as, the ESAs and commercial data providers) see section 4 
below, reporting agents are the financial institutions subject to reporting obligations.
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framework of the ESS in the field of statistics.72 Article 15(4) ensures that before 
requesting information from the ESAs the ESRB will take account of existing statis-
tics produced, disseminated and developed by the ESS and the ESCB. In addition, 
the third principle of the Decision requires the ESRB Secretariat, the ECB and the 
ESAs to maximise the use of existing information and the investigation phase outlined 
above involves examining the available information with international institutions, 
such as the IMF and the BIS, before proceeding to conduct an ad hoc survey. For this 
arrangement to function, the ESRB will have to finalise agreements with these insti-
tutions relating to the exchange of information and in particular the confidentiality 
regime to be applied.73 
Thirdly, ensuring non-excessive data collection will result in reduced burden on 
reporting agents and accordingly will be aligned with the ‘fit for purpose’ require-
ment. 
Finally, there is no consensus on how detailed the information collected for the 
purpose of conducting macro-prudential analysis needs to be. While more granular 
data enable better analysis, the compilation and the sharing of the information become 
more difficult.74 Compilation is more difficult because of possible lack of comparabil-
ity of the data and sharing of information is more difficult because more granular data 
potentially raise concerns over confidentiality.75 The Decision is the ESRB’s first 
attempt to tackle this challenge via the granularity rule of thumb and as suggested 
this rule may need to be revaluated and adjusted in times of crisis, when more granu-
lar information may be required.76 
Comparable
Comparability of data is critical across Member States, across sectors (going 
beyond the banking sector, including other major financial institutions such as 
insurance companies and hedge funds), across financial products and ultimately 
across global markets.77 Both the de Larosière group and the Issing Committee 
recommended the creation of an international risk map that will compromise all 
72 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 15(4) referring to Council Regulation (EC) 223/2009 on European 
Statistics [2009] OJ L87/164 and to Council Regulation (EC) 2533/98 concerning the Collection of 
Statistical Information by the European Central Bank [2008] OJ L318/8.
73 This will be done in accordance with Art. 28 of the Decision of the European Systemic Risk 
Board of 20 January 2011 adopting the Rules of Procedures of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB/2011/1) OJ C58/4.
74 Stephan Cecchetti, Ingo Fender and Patrick McGuire, Toward a Global Risk Map (2010) BIS 
Working Papers No 309 <http://www.bis.org/publ/work309.htm> accessed 10 November 2011.
75 FSB and IMF, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps, Implementation Progress Report 
(June 2011) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/063011.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011, p 24.
76 See section 2 above on p 12. 
77 FSB and IMF, Information Gaps Report (2009) (n 4) and Implementation Progress Report (2011) 
(n 4) that sets the task of harmonising data collections from G-20 economies in high priority over 2011.
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these elements.78 The suggested risk map would include common data base with 
all the needed information for identifying systemic risks on a global scale. Until 
this utopia is reached the ESRB will have to ensure that it uses, to the extent pos-
sible, harmonised methodologies and data collection.79 The ESAs will play a central 
role in achieving comparability of micro and macro information within the EU as 
they are responsible for creating and updating common reporting templates for their 
sectors.80
Timely but Accurate
The financial crisis has revealed the need to ensure the timeliness of the information 
being collected. Data, which could have been useful in monitoring events during 
the crisis, was available with a lengthy time lag.81 This means that information 
should be collected by the ESRB regularly at short intervals and, where necessary, 
and in particular during times of crisis, on an ad hoc basis. While timely provision 
of data to the ESRB is vital to detect systemic risks upon their emergence, the 
ESRB will also have to strike the right balance between data timeliness and its 
accuracy.82 On the one hand, rushed false alarms will damage the credibility of the 
ESRB and therefore will jeopardise its effective operation and on the other hand, 
tardy responses will defeat the purpose of establishing such an institution. 
Evolving Framework
EU and global Markets respond to technological developments and regulatory ini-
tiatives and continuously adapt and innovate. Therefore, the task of collecting infor-
mation is a dynamic one and addressing information gaps is not a one-off exercise.83 
The ESRB should aim to adapt its collection efforts rapidly and identify new areas 
78 The de Larosière Report (n 13), Recommandation 27; The Issing Committee, New Financial 
Order (London, 2 April 2009) (hereinafter “the Issing Committee”), para. 2. 
79 The Decision, Annex III, s 3(d).
80 See for instance, the EBA Regulation, Art. 29(1)(c). For a more detailed discussion of harmonisa-
tion of the reporting rules see section 4 below on p 36.
For achieving global comparability see FSB, Understanding Financial Linkages: The Common 
Reporting Template for Global Systematically Important Banks (October 2011) <http://www.financial-
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_111006.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011.
81 FSB and IMF, Information Gaps Report (2009)(n 4). Data provided in a timely manner means 
that it is made available to policy makers in time to be used in making decisions. A related requirement 
is the punctuality of the data that refers to the time lag between the scheduled and the actual release of 
data. See the ECB SQF, Principle 12. 
82 The trade-off between timeliness and accuracy is a well debated issue, e.g., ECB, Trade-off 
between Timeliness and Accuracy, ECB Requirements for General Economic Statistics (15 March 2001) 
<http://dsbb.imf.org/vgn/images/pdfs/bierahnert.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011.
83 ‘Can Policymakers Fill the Gaps in Their Knowledge About the Financial System?’ The Econo-
mist (13 Jan 2011) <http://www.economist.com/node/17900268?story_id=17900268&fsrc=rss> accessed 
10 November 2011.
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where information is needed, needed more frequently or needed in a different form.84 
The importance of certain data sets will change over time and there will be a need 
to introduce new data sets. Aiming at moving targets and hitting the red bull’s eye 
in time will be one of the most challenging tasks of the ESRB. It will have to keep 
track of new complex areas that may contain systemic threats to the financial sys-
tem. The most prominent example of this, at present, is the market for Exchange-
Traded Funds (ETFs) and synthetic ETFs in particular. These markets have 
expanded widely over the last 10 years85 and the current estimation suggests that 
the value of the European ETF market exceeds US$300 billion.86 However, a com-
bination of lax regulatory supervision in this area, complexity of the products and 
lack of transparency make this area fertile ground for systemic risks. ETFs have 
not escaped the scrutiny of major international institutions (the FSB, IMF and the 
BIS) and regulators such as the SEC and the ESRB. The IMF and BIS have recently 
published reports warning of the systemic risks that these products can impose on 
the global financial system.87 The ESMA quickly followed by initiating a public 
consultation on these products and the ESRB gave its response, encouraging the 
taking of measures to mitigate systemic risks in this area.88
Confidentiality
Confidentiality creates confidence and this, in turn, brings cooperation in sharing 
of information. Without satisfactory confidentiality arrangements Member States 
84 FSB, IMF and BIS, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks – Update to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (14 February 2011) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_1103.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; FSB, IMF and BIS, Macroprudential Policy 
Tools and Frameworks – Progress Report (27 October 2011) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_111027b.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
85 The ESRB Response to the ESMA Discussion Paper on Policy Orientation and Guidelines for 
UCITS Exchange-Traded Funds and Structured UCITS (21 September 2011) <http://www.esrb.europa.
eu/pub/pdf/ESRB_response_to_ESMA_consultation_exchange_traded_funds.pdf?02bbca4814f016d73b
1650196e62adc9> accessed 10 November 2011.
86 Jean-Claude Trichet and Mervyn King, Andrea Enria, Introductory Statement to the ESRB Press 
Conference (Frankfurt, 22 June 2011).
87 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, Durable Financial Stability Getting There from Here 
68–72 (April 2011); Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange-Traded 
Funds (2011) BIS Working Papers No 349; Harold Bradely and Robert E Litan, Kaufmann Foundation, 
Chocking the Recovery: Why New Growth Companies Aren’t going Public and Unrecognised Risks of 
Future Market Disruptions (8 November 2010) <http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/etf_study_11-
8-10.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; ‘Exchange-Traded Funds, Too Much of a Good Thing, the Risk 
Created by Complicating a Simple Idea’ The Economist (23 June 2011) <http://www.economist.com/
node/18864254> accessed 10 November 2011.
88 The ESMA Discussion Paper on Policy Orientation and Guidelines for UCITS Exchange-traded 
Funds and Structured UCITS, ESMA/2011/220, 22 July 2011; The ESRB response to the ETFs Consul-
tation Paper September 2011 (n 76) suggesting looking into the possibility of withdrawing the UCITS 
label from such products. Attempts to limit the information gap in this area are under way thorough 
conduct of ad hoc surveys, see Vítor Constâncio, How Fit are Statistics for Use in Macro-prudential 
Oversight? (The Sixth ECB Statistics Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 17 April 2012).
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will not be willing to share information about local institutions that are experienc-
ing difficulties, for fear that the information will be leaked and impact market 
confidence. Consequently, the ESRB Regulation, The ECB Regulation and the 
ESAs Regulation provide the necessary legal framework for safeguarding the con-
fidentiality of the information being shared albeit with several concerns as dis-
cussed before89. The ESRB will need to ensure that these will not be an obstacle 
for smooth flow of information by setting up and ensuring the strict observance of 
specific confidentiality arrangements and procedures with the ESAs and the national 
central banks as well as with international institutions and third countries. 
Ensuring that data collected by the ESRB is of high quality and complies with the 
characteristics outlined above would be the first hurdle to overcome towards effective 
macro-prudential supervision. Yet, another hurdle is ensuring that this data reaches 
the ESRB on a timely basis and that any obstacles to the smooth flow of information, 
both legal and practical, are removed. The subsequent section elaborates on the 
sources of data and the mechanisms by which data is passed on to the ESRB from 
these sources and highlights possible obstacles identified in this process. 
4. Which Data is being Collected by the ESRB?
The Various Sources from which the ESRB collects its Data and the Possible 
Obstacles to smooth Flow of Information
Outlining which data is actually being collected by the ESRB is a tricky challenge. 
The ESRB has been in operation for two years, a relatively short period and there 
is limited amount of publicly available evidence about the data collection process 
in general and about the sources from which this data is being collected, in par-
ticular. The data which is being collected by the ESRB for macro-prudential over-
sight of the financial system within the EU is termed here the ‘information base’ 
of the ESRB. The ‘information base’ comprises available data provided by the ECB 
and international institutions; micro-prudential information provided by the ESAs; 
market data from commercial data providers and other data sets and market intel-
ligence from private stakeholders.90 The data retrieved from these sources will be 
the starting point of the ESRB macro-prudential analysis, which eventually may 
lead to issuance of early warnings and policy recommendations for remedial action 
when significant systemic risks emerge. The ESRB can be described here as a 
central hub, pooling datasets from various sources and connecting them together 
to create a constantly changing systemic risk map within the EU.
89 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 8; The ECB Regulation, Art. 6 and the EBA Regulation, the ESMA 
Regulation and the EIOPA Regulation, Art. 70, respectively. See section 2 above for several concerns 
raised regarding these provisions.
90 Jean-Claude Trichet, Introductory Statement, Hearing on the ESRB before the Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (7 February 2011) <http://www.esrb.europa.
eu/news/pr/2011/html/sp110207.en.html> accessed 10 November 2011.
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Each one of these sources presents unique challenges and possible obstacles to the 
smooth flow of information to the ESRB. The possible obstacles can be identified in 
the legal framework within which the ESRB interacts with these data sources as well 
as in the mechanism by which information is being exchanged with them.
Existing Data and its Enhancement
The ESRB does not operate in a vacuum. The European and international arenas 
are crowded with institutions and central banks aimed at ensuring financial stabil-
ity and identifying and addressing vulnerabilities in financial markets, either as a 
main objective or as a collector of data that can be utilised for macro-prudential 
analysis. The ECB, the FSB, the IMF and the BIS are just a few. This section notes 
that a significant amount of information is already being collected by these institu-
tions and provides a considerable share of the data needed for macro-prudential 
analysis. This type of information can be referred to as the ‘existing supply’91 and 
it originates from the ECB, the ESCB and other international institutions. Clearly, 
post-crisis the ‘existing supply’ is being enhanced to tailor more accurately the 
global macro-prudential needs and where appropriate, the specific needs of the 
ESRB. Notably, the ‘existing supply’ of the ESRB is supplemented by other data 
sources to ensure a robust information base. 
Existing Data from the ECB
When considering the establishment of the ESRB, the European Council recognised 
the need to rely on an existing framework, exploiting already available information 
at the disposal of central banks.92 The ECB, in cooperation with national central 
banks, compiles and disseminates a wide range of monetary statistics and indicators 
regarding financial institutions. Together with the Eurosystem it monitors develop-
ments in the euro area and the EU banking sector as well as in other financial 
sectors to assess the possible vulnerabilities in the financial sector and its resilience 
to potential shocks.93 Nonetheless, risk assessments conducted by central banks 
were generally not made with the specific aim of suggesting concrete remedial 
prudential policy or regulatory action and therefore their recommendations were 
outlined in broad terms and the discussion of the risks in the public sphere tended 
to be mostly of a qualitative nature.94 By contrast, the ESRB is expected to collect 
91 Vitor Constâncio, Information Requirements for Macro-prudential Oversight and the Role of 
Central Banks (The Fifth ECB Conference on Central Bank Statistics: What Did the Financial Cri-
sis Change?, Frankfurt, 19–20 October 2010) <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp101020.
en.html> accessed 10 November 2011.
92 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on Community Macro Prudential Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board COM (2009) 499 final, para. 6.2.2.
93 Ibid., para. 6.1. 
94 Charles AE Goodhart, The Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability 
2 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 5 (2011). 
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information that will allow it to form a deeper understanding of the potential mag-
nitude of the risks, the interconnections within the financial system and between 
the financial system and the real economy. Furthermore, in order to produce con-
crete policy suggestions in the prudential and regulatory area, its analysis will have 
to be more precise, involve quantitative assessments and clear risk prioritisation.95 
Yet, given the ECB expertise and in-depth knowledge on macro-prudential issues 
its involvement is essential and it plays an important and central role in the new 
financial supervisory architecture.96 The ECB ‘ensures’ the ESRB Secretariat and 
provides analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the ESRB97. 
The missions of the Secretariat include, in particular, the collection and processing 
of information on behalf and for the benefit of the fulfilment of the ESRB tasks98 
and accordingly, confidential statistical information collected by the ECB is to be 
shared with the ESRB.99 The linkage between the ESRB and the ECB is strength-
ened by the fact that the ECB’s President and Vice President serve on the General 
Board of the ESRB.100 Taking on this central role in the functioning of the ESRB, 
95 Vitor Constânciov (n 91).
On macro-prudential analysis information needs see Lorenzo B Smaghi, Macro-prudential Super-
vision (The CEPR/ESI 13th Annual Conference on “Financial Supervision in an Uncertain World”, 
European Banking Centre at Venice International University, Venice, 25–26 September 2009) <http://
www.bis.org/review/r090929e.pdf?frames=0> accessed 10 November 2011.
96 This is not without criticism; see for instance Williem Buiter (n 36). 
97 The ECB Regulation, Arts 2 and 3, the ESRB Regulation, Art. 4(4).
By conferring upon the ECB specific tasks related to prudential supervision the Council implemented 
for the first time Art. 105(6) of the Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/01 (hereinafter the EU 
Treaty), acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB and 
receiving the assent of the European Parliament. 
For difficulties in relying on Art. 105(6) of the EU Treaty as the legal basis for entrusting the ECB 
with specific tasks see Jane Welch, Written evidence to the Treasury Committee on the Proposals 
for European Financial Supervision (13 November 2009) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/37/37we04.htm> accessed 10 November 2011. First, Art. 105(6) specifies 
that the Council can confer specific tasks on the ECB “with the specific exception of insurance under-
takings”. This unambiguous wording makes it difficult to see how the ECB can be entrusted by the 
ESRB with the task of collecting information about insurance undertakings for the specific purpose of 
improving macro-prudential supervision. But see Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Financial Crisis: Where Does 
Europe Stand? (2009 ECON meeting with national parliaments, Brussels, 12 February 2009). Secondly, 
both the ESRB Regulation (para. 31 of the Preamble) and the ESAs Regulations (see for instance, the 
EBA Regulation para. 17 of the Preamble) are based on Art. 95 of the EU Treaty (now Art. 114 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which is designed to facilitate the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market. These measures are “EEA relevant” and would normally 
apply in due course to the European Economic Area (EEA) EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 
states – Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. However, the EEA Agreement does not cover pArticipation 
in economic and monetary union and accordingly EEA states are not bound by the monetary policy 
provisions of the EU Treaty (including Art. 105).
98 The ECB Regulation, Art. 5(1).
99 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 15(4).
100 With voting rights, the ECB Regulation, Art. 6. Furthermore, for the first five years the Presi-
dent of the ECB will be the Chair of the ESRB. For the subsequent terms, the Chair of the ESRB shall 
be designated in accordance with the modalities determined on the basis of the review provided for in 
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the ECB stated on many occasions that it is working to make improvements in its 
statistical bases in order to support the data needs of ESRB101and one of the prom-
inent initiatives in this regard is the enhancement the Consolidated Banking Data 
(CBD).102 The ECB recognised that the major gap in its current available statistics 
is the lack of information on the inter-linkages within the financial system (includ-
ing exposures between institutions in the banking sector and institutions in non-
regulated markets).103 The ESRB is challenged to bridge this gap and include in its 
information base data on interconnections in the financial system in order to support 
concrete policy recommendations. It can be expected that in the next few years the 
ECB will receive from the ESRB relatively frequently new data requests that will 
translate into ad hoc surveys.104 Such surveys will enable the ESRB to retain flex-
ibility in order to meet changing data needs, which reflect innovation and emer-
gence of new areas with systemic impact in financial markets. Eventually, these 
data requirements will form part of the regular supervisory and statistical data that 
are comparable across Member States and across institutions and will be disclosed 
to the ESRB on a regular basis.105
Finally, it is to be noted that the ECB monitors developments in the euro area and 
in order to ensure that data on non eurozone countries is comprehensive, regular pro-
vision of information by the ESCB should take place. Regular exchange of informa-
tion with the ESCB is enshrined in the ESRB Regulation and the mechanism for ad 
hoc surveys conducted by the ESCB is set out in the Decision.106 Yet, as already been 
discussed in section 2, the Decision does not provide the necessary detailed arrange-
ments for regular provision of aggregated information by the ESCB. The Decision 
sets out in Annex I the mechanism for the regular provision of aggregated information 
by the ECB, while information on non-eurozone countries is to be provided to the 
ESRB so far it is made available to the ECB on a voluntary basis. 
Art. 20 (The ESRB Regulation, Art. 5(1)). Still, the ECB made it clear that the ESRB is a distinct and 
separate body from the ECB and that it will not change in any way the mandate and the functioning 
of the ECB’s statutory role, see for instance, Jean-Claude Trichet, Macro-prudential Regulation as an 
Approach to Contain Systemic Risk: Economic Foundations, Diagnostic Tools and Policy Instruments 
(13th conference of the ECB-CFS Research Network, Frankfurt, 27 September 2010) <http://www.ecb.
int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100927.en.html> accessed 10 November 2011.
101 Vitor Constâncio (n 91), pt 3; Peter Praet (n 1), para. 3.2. 
102 The CBD is a set of data that provides various statistics about the EU banking system on con-
solidated basis and is published by the ECB on a semi-annual basis.
Anna Maria Agresti, Stephano Borgioli and Paolo Poloni, Enhancement of ECB Statistics for Finan-
cial Stability Analysis 18 (the Fifth Irving Fisher Committee Conference, Frankfurt, November 2011), 
http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb34.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011.
See also Vitor Constâncio (n 91) on other available ECB datasets that can be utilised for macro-
prudential analysis, such as the euro area financial accounts and the surveys on the access to finance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro area and the EU. 
103 Jürgen Stark, Central Banks Statistics: What did the Financial Crisis Change? (The Fifth ECB 
Conference on Statistics, Frankfurt, 20 October 2010).
104 Ibid.
105 Vitor Constâncio (n 91).
106 The ESRB Regulation. Art. 15(4).
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Existing Data from International Institutions
The financial crisis has demonstrated the global nature of systemic risks. A com-
prehensive assessment of systemic risks will need to take into account any global 
developments in financial markets. In this respect cooperation is needed between 
the ESRB and other international institutions, such as the IMF and the FSB. Vari-
ous data and statistics provided by these institutions are publicly available and can 
be easily accessed.107 For data which is not publicly available, the ESRB will need 
to finalise, in the near future, agreements relating to the exchange of information 
and in particular the confidentiality regime to be applied. 
The IMF and the FSB – Exploring and Closing Global Information Gaps
The IMF has functioned for more than 60 years, but since its establishment its 
membership has widened and its operation, structure and governance has consider-
ably evolved along with the global economy. The IMF is mandated to oversee the 
international monetary system and monitor the economic and financial policies but 
it also plays a role in the surveillance of the financial sector and strengthening the 
global financial stability.108 This latter role is exercised through initiatives such as 
the Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP), collection and dissemination 
of the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), encouraging greater disclosure 
of FSIs through the Co-ordinated Compilation Exercise (CCE) and regular bilateral 
and multilateral surveillance often reported in the IMF’s Global Financial Stability 
Report (GFSR). The IMF is making progress in developing macro-prudential 
frameworks and sharpening its risk assessments to identify build up of vulnera-
bilities.109 The new product of the Consolidated Spillover Report signals the efforts 
of the IMF to focus on linkages between sectors and countries making its surveil-
lance as interconnected as the global economy.110 
107 Such as the World Economic Outlook. For other data sets and statistics see <http://www.imf.
org/external/data.htm> accessed 10 November 2010.
108 Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Arts 1 and 4; John Palmer and Yoke Wang Tok, The Trien-
nial Surveillance Review–External Study-IMF and Global Financial Stability (25 July 2011) (hereinafter 
the TSR), para. 15; The TSR notes that the IMF, in many ways, is already playing an overreaching role 
of a global financial stability advisor though there are still legal, operational and other limitations to 
exercising this role efficiently. This possible expansion of the IMF mandate is outside the scope of this 
Article. For the limitations in the IMF multilateral surveillance mandate under Art. IV see the IMF, The 
Fund’s Mandate-An Overview (January 2010).
109 GFSR (September 2011), Chapter 1.
110 On the FSAP see the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), Report on the Evaluation of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (5 January 2006); On FSIs and CCEs see Owen Evans and others, 
Macro Prudential Indicators of Financial Soundness IMF Occasional Paper 192 (2000) <http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/192/op192.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; Comprehensive information 
on the FSIs can also be found at http://fsi.imf.org; On Consolidated Spillover Report see IMF, Consoli-
dated Spillover Report – Implications from the Analysis of the Systemic-5 (11 July 2011) <http://www.
imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/071111.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
ANAT KELLER512
The IMF works alongside the FSB which was established by the Group of Twenty 
(G-20) Heads of State in April 2009 with a mandate to promote global financial sta-
bility.111 The FSB consists of national authorities responsible for financial stability in 
significant international financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-
specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of 
central bank experts.112 It assesses vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, iden-
tifies and oversees action needed to address them and in collaboration with the IMF 
is responsible for Early Warning Exercises (EWEs). Furthermore, the FSB is man-
dated to promote cooperation and information exchange between authorities respon-
sible for financial stability.113 Based on this mandate the FSB was called on by the 
G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in April 2009 to explore, 
together with the IMF, information gaps and provide proposals for strengthening data 
collection. The joint report, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps”, which 
included 20 recommendations, was endorsed at the meeting of the G-20 finance min-
isters and central bank governors in November 2009. The report identified data gaps 
in assessing the build-up of risks in the financial sector, understanding international 
network connections, and monitoring vulnerabilities of domestic economies to shocks. 
It made recommendations to close these gaps and to improve the communication of 
official statistics. The FSB is monitoring the progress in the implementation of these 
recommendations and at the time of writing, already published two progress reports 
in 2010 and 2011.114 The 2011 progress report outlines the significant progress that 
has already been made to close identified data gaps. For instance, the progressing 
work of the FSB on a common reporting template for global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs) will improve consistency in the collection and sharing 
of data on the interconnectedness and common exposures of these institutions.115 This 
only forms part of further post–financial crisis data enhancement of the BIS and the 
IMF statistics, providing more granular information and more frequent reporting to 
meet macro-prudential needs.116
111 ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System’ (London Summit, 2 April 2009)
The FSB is successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) which was founded on the 20th Feb-
ruary 1999 by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of seven at a meeting 
in Bonn.
112 Current members are listed in Annex A of the FSB Charter available on the FSB website <http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org>. In September 2010, the IMF became a member of the FSB.
113 The FSB Charter, Art. 2.
114 A follow-up report was provided to G-20 Ministers and Governors in June 2010 followed by an 
updated progress report in June 2011.
115 FSB, Consultation Paper – Understanding Financial Linkages: a Common Data Template 
for Global Systemically Important Banks (6 October 2011) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_111006.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; Adelheid Burgi-Schmelz and others, Enhanc-
ing Information on Financial Stability (The Irving Fisher Committee Conference, Basel, August 2010) 
<http://www.bis.org/ifc/events/5ifcconf/burgi.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
116 Other initiatives mentioned in the Progress Report – The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps 
(June 2011) include enhancement of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) International Bank-
ing Statistics (IBS) data to provide more granular information on a nationality basis; Enhancement and 
increase of frequency of reporting of data on cross-border security holding in the IMF’s Coordinated 
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The ESRB’s key challenge is to integrate these data in its own information base 
by cooperating closely with these international players.117 This can be described as a 
two side cooperation: in one direction, international institutions will receive more 
granular data on the EU financial system that will enhance their own information 
base,118 and, in the other direction, the ESRB will be able to fit the data collected 
within the ESFS in the world jigsaw and get a clearer picture of emerging risks in the 
financial system within the EU. 
The brief statement in the ESRB first 2011 annual report that it began to foster 
working relations with various international institutions and bodies, such as the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council (the FSOC) is somewhat disappointing. The 2011 
Annual Report of the FSOC does not address at all the international cooperation with 
its parallel institution in the EU and reinforces the impression of a slow progress in 
this aspect.
Micro-prudential Information provided by the ESAs
In order to produce high quality macro-prudential analysis the ESRB needs to draw 
from both top-down and bottom-up analysis. A top-down analysis focuses on aggre-
gate macro-financial data, and is performed in order to monitor vulnerabilities and 
assess conditions in specific sectors with possible implications for system-wide 
risks. It can broadly identify areas of potential systemic risk, indicating where more 
detailed and granular analysis is needed.119 The ‘existing supply’ of the ECB and 
other international institutions statistics forms the basis for this analysis. Bottom-up 
analysis, on the other hand, relies on micro-level or firm-specific data that is then 
aggregated to produce sectoral or system-wide assessments.120 Micro-prudential 
data provided by the ESAs forms the basis for conducting bottom-up analysis and 
ultimately for forming a bird’s eye view of the financial system in the EU. Yet, the 
channels of information between the ESRB and each one of the ESAs are not free 
from obstacles.121 
It has been seen in section 2 that concerns exist regarding the aggregate regular 
flow of information between the ESRB and the ESAs as set out in the Decision. 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and Continuing work of the IMF to increase number of countries 
disseminating Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), increasing the frequency of the reporting and 
reviewing the FSIs list.
117 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 2(i). In the ESRB Annual Report 2011, p 12.
118 Art. 9(4) of the ESRB Regulation permits, where appropriate, high-level representatives from 
international financial organisations carrying out activities directly related to the tasks of the ESRB to 
be invited to attend the meetings of the ESRB General Board.
119 Vitor Constânciov (n 91), part 3. 
120 Vitor Constânciov (n 91), part 3.
121 The IMF, Lessons from the European Financial Stability Framework Exercise (2011) Country 
Report No. 11/186 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11186.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011. According to this recent IMF report, whereas the EBA has indicated it will have access to all con-
fidential data available to national supervisors on a regular basis, reportedly the EIOPA and the ESMA 
are facing opposition in their efforts to obtain all the necessary data (The IMF Country Report, para. 57).
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Obstacles may also exist when the ESRB requests from the ESAs data on individual 
institutions (not in aggregate or summary form). The ESRB Regulation allows the 
exchange of such information only on an ad hoc basis, following proportionate and 
justified request considering the prevailing market situation.122 On the one hand, this 
mechanism restricts the ESRB’s access to sensitive micro-prudential data and may 
give rise to problems in practice, for example, if it is necessary to compare bank-
specific data over time on a systematic basis.123 On the other hand, it is essential to 
ensure confidentiality of such sensitive information, particularly due to the broad 
range of parties involved in the ESRB’s governance structure that arguably may 
increase the risk of leakages. In order to ensure a smooth exchange of non-aggregate 
information the ESRB needs to establish guidelines with the ESAs outlining criteria 
for handling such “reasoned” requests.124 It is suggested that these guidelines could 
form part of the Decision alongside the aggregated ad hoc requests and be subject to 
the principles outlined in section 3 of Annex III of the Decision, including safeguard-
ing confidentiality.125
The smooth flow of information to the ESRB depends not only on open channels 
between the ESRB and the ESAs but also on open channels between the ESAs and 
national supervisors and financial institutions. Article 35 of the EBA Regulation, the 
ESMA Regulation and the EIOPA Regulation, respectively set out the way the rel-
evant ESA will collect information for its supervisory tasks in line with Art. 15 of the 
ESRB Regulation. The respective ESA is to first take into account any relevant exist-
ing statistics at the EU level, then request data from national supervisors and if infor-
mation is still not available or not available in a timely manner request the information 
from the Member States’ other public bodies. Only as a last resort and upon a duly 
justified and reasoned request is the ESA allowed to request data directly from indi-
vidual financial institutions. 
The information sharing between the ESAs and the national supervisors is done, 
inter alia, through the framework of colleges of supervisors. The revised Capital 
Requirements Directive provided the legal foundation for the establishment of col-
leges of supervisors for cross-border banking groups.126 These are permanent, although 
flexible, structures for cooperation and coordination among the authorities respon-
122 The ESRB Regulation, Arts 15(6)–(7).
123 IMF Country Report (n 121), para. 24.
124 Ibid.
125 For discussion on the confidentiality agreement between the ESRB and the ESAs, November 
2011 see p 10, n 27.
126 Directive 2009/111/EC of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 
2007/64/EC as regards Banks Affiliated to Central Institutions, Certain Own Funds Items, Large Expo-
sures, Supervisory Arrangements, and Crisis Management OJ L302/97 (hereinafter the CRD, known 
as CRD 2), Art. 131a. 
On the operation of colleges of supervisors see also Julia Black, Restructuring Global and EU Finan-
cial Regulation: Capacities, Coordination and Learning 18 LSE Law Society and Economy Working 
Papers (2010) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2010-18_Black.pdf> accessed 10 Novem-
ber 2011; The House of Lords, European Union Committee, Fourteenth Report of Session 2008–2009 
on the Future of EU Regulation and Supervision HL Paper 106 Volume I paras 196–197 (2009). 
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sible for and involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-border 
banking groups.127 The colleges of supervisors provide a platform for sharing of 
information, views and assessments amongst supervisors;128 developing a common 
understanding of the risk profile of the group at both the group and solo levels and 
taking due account of macro-prudential risks; developing examination programmes 
based on the risk assessment of the group; coordinating supervisory reviews and car-
rying out joint risk assessments; coordinating decisions taken by individual authorities 
and striving to reach consensus.129 The mechanism has been praised for its contribu-
tion to building trust between supervisors and developing a consistent interpretation 
and application of regulatory provisions across the group.130 However, despite the 
recognised benefits of the colleges it is not always clear that the supervisors’ incen-
tives are such as to maximise information sharing. The national authorities may be 
reluctant to share information with their college colleagues about a distressed financial 
institution to protect their own jurisdiction. Consequently, there may be scope for 
information not being brought at all to the attention of the college participants, or not 
being brought on a timely basis.131 In particular, softer information with more subjec-
tive nature, such as supervisory risk assessments, makes delays and manipulation 
relatively easy.132 Safeguarding confidentiality, via a network of bilateral and multi-
lateral Memoranda of Understandings, might minimise this problem and maximise 
coordination and cooperation process within supervisory colleges.133 However, these 
127 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (now replaced by the EBA), Guidelines for 
the Operational Functioning of Supervisory Colleges (15 June 2010) GL 34 <http://www.eba.europa.
eu/documents/Publications/Standards---Guidelines/2010/Colleges/CollegeGuidelines.aspx> accessed 10 
November 2011. 
128 Members of the college are supervisors from a member state where a subsidiary is located or 
which contains significant branches of the financial institution, central banks as appropriate, and third 
countries’ competent authorities where appropriate (CRD 2, Art. 33). 
129 Ibid., This is not an exhaustive list. 
130 The European Union Committee’s Report on the Future of EU Regulation and Supervision paras 
145–151 (n 117). In the international level see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Good 
Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges (October 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs177.pdf> 
accessed 16 April 2012, in particular Principle 1 on College Objectives. 
131 The IMF Country Report (n 121), para. 27. 
See also the CEBS (now replaced by the EBA) Report of the Peer Review on the Functioning 
of Supervisory Colleges (18 October 2010) <http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/Review-Panel/Peer-
Review-Report-on-the-functioning-of-colleges.aspx> accessed 10 November 2011. For a comprehen-
sive account of the conflict between the home and host supervisors in sharing information see Katia, 
D’Hulster, Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing Between Home and Host Supervisors, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No 5871 (November 2011). 
132 Cornelia Holthausen and Thomas Ronde, Cooperation in International Banking Supervision, 
Working Paper No 316, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main (March 2004). The MoUs are 
confidential and therefore the accountability of its parties is limited. 
133 According to the IMF Country Report (n 121), para. 27 there are in some cases legal prohibitions 
on the sharing of information, so that supervisors from one Member State cannot provide more than 
generalities about the activities of the bank/insurer they are supervising. In contrast, the EBA Report 
of the Peer Review on the Functioning of Supervisory Colleges (18 October 2010) <http://www.eba.
europa.eu/documents/Review-Panel/Peer-Review-Report-on-the-functioning-of-colleges.aspx> accessed 
ANAT KELLER516
non-binding and non-enforceable agreements do not resolve the incentive problem in 
sharing information between supervisors and therefore cannot guarantee a complete 
flow of information.134 To maximise incentives for sharing information, establishment 
of ex ante agreements between supervisors setting out principles for fair “burden 
sharing” in such a manner that supervisors have an interest in the outcome of the 
institution as a whole should be considered.135
The ESAs were formed with a view to complement this existing system of colleges 
of supervisors. They are tasked with promoting and mitigating the efficient, effective 
and consistent functioning of the colleges of supervisors.136 In order to facilitate the 
work of the colleges, the ESAs have full participation: they are able to participate in 
the colleges’ activities, request further deliberations of a college, request to schedule 
a meeting or add a point to the agenda of the meeting.137 The active participation in 
the colleges will enable the ESAs to gather qualitative information to complement 
the regular and ad hoc data collection as discussed in section 2. Yet, a satisfactory 
legal framework to accommodate the exchange of data originated in the colleges of 
supervisors with the ESAs for the purpose of channelling it to the ESRB does not 
exist. For instance, the ESAs are tasked in Art. 31(f) of the ESAs Regulations with 
establishing and managing a central European database containing all the relevant 
micro information gathered from competent authorities through the colleges and 
regulatory reporting obligations.138 The ESAs Regulations specify that the competent 
authorities in the colleges will have access to this database139 but fail to permit access 
to the ESRB subject to confidentiality agreements.140
A laconic requirement of the colleges of supervisors for banking, insurance and 
financial conglomerate sectors to cooperate with the authorities can be found in the 
Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles.141 Guidelines set out in 2010 by 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (the CEBS and now replaced by the 
16 April 2012 states briefly in paragraph 79 that no particular problems with confidentiality issues were 
identified within the colleges.
134 Andrea Enria and Jukka Vesala (2003) Externalities in Supervision in JJM Kremers, D 
 Schoenmaker and PJ Wierts (eds), Financial Supervision in Europe, 60–89 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
135 The IMF Country Report (n 121), para. 28. Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, Fiscal 
Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises International Journal of Central Banking 141 (2009).
136 The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA Regulation, Art. 21, respectively 
137 Ibid.
138 Andrea Enria, Micro-Data for Micro- and Macro-prudential Purposes (The Sixth ECB Statis-
tics Conference “Central Bank Statistics as a Servant of Two Separate Mandates: Price Stability and 
Mitigation of Systemic Risk”, 17–18 April 2012); <http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/stats6th/
Session_3_1_Mr_Andrea_Enria.pdf?818e41ada2fc4f5ec98c06124ef7d742> accessed 16 April 2012.
139 The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA Regulation, Art. 31(f).
140 But see the Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Strengthening EU Financial Super-
vision (9 June 2009), 10862/09, para. 9(3). In the absence of specific reference, the exchange may fall 
under the general provision for information exchange with the ESRB, The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA 
Regulation and the ESMA Regulation, Art. 35, respectively.
141 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), and their Interim Working Committee 
on Financial Conglomerates (IWCFC), Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles (27  January 
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EBA) provide a more detailed provision for sharing information obtained in the col-
leges with the EBA (hereinafter: the ‘Colleges Guidelines’).142 In particular, guideline 
16 provides that the EBA will be invited to attend the meetings and exposed to all the 
information of particular relevance for the purposes of supervisory convergence. The 
Colleges Guidelines should be updated to reflect the new purpose for which these 
data are needed: disclosure of data to the ESRB for conducting its macro-prudential 
supervision. Confidentiality of data should be strictly guarded particularly ensuring 
that specific institutions cannot be identified from the disclosed data. To this end, the 
rules established and agreed between the ESRB and the ESAs for data aggregation 
can form the basis for the disclosure to the ESRB. 
Another area that should be addressed is the substance of the information exchanged 
between financial institutions and national supervisors, which will be streaming later 
on to the ESAs and then to the ESRB. In accordance with Art. 132 of Directive 
2006/48/EC, as amended, competent authorities are required to communicate on their 
own initiative to competent authorities in other Member States with any information 
that is essential for the exercise of their tasks under this directive.143 Any relevant 
information will be communicated on request, taking into account the importance of 
the institution concerned.144 A Peer Review conducted by the CEBS in 2010 on the 
operation of colleges of supervisors revealed a great deal of variety in the information 
being shared in the colleges.145 Colleges’ members observed that no clear distinction 
could be drawn between ‘essential’ information and ‘relevant’ information, as pro-
vided for in Art. 132 of Directive 2006/48/EC.146 Hence, the Review Panel suggested 
that putting in place an agreement on a non-exhaustive list of information to be shared 
within the colleges would assist the ESAs in creating convergence among colleges 
and consistency of the information.147 
The cooperation between EU supervisory colleges is only the tip of the iceberg. It 
is to be remembered that nearly all major EU financial institutions have substantial 
activity worldwide.148 At present, these institutions might participate in international 
2009) <http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Other%20Publications/Supervisory%20Col 
leges/10-common-principles.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011.
142 CEBS’ Guidelines for the Operational Functioning of Supervisory Colleges.
143 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions OJ L177. Informa-
tion is essential if it could materially influence the assessment of the financial soundness of a credit 
institution or financial institution in another Member State (Art. 132(1)).
144 Ibid.
145 and a number of commonalities, The 2010 CEBS’ Report of the Peer Review on Colleges Func-
tioning (n 131), para. 68.
146 See n 143.
147 The 2010 CEBS Report of the Peer Review on Colleges Functioning (n 131), para. 75. Colleges 
act as vertical groups for enhancing cooperation in one specific institution but there is need also for hori-
zontal convergence, connecting between the colleges, see the IMF Country Report (n 105), para. 149.
148 The IMF Country Report (n 111), para. 29; Deutche Bank Research, Home Sweet Home? Inter-
national Banking After the Crisis EU Monitor 80 (9 June 2011) <http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/
DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000274061.PDF> accessed 10 November 2011.
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colleges as well.149 If an international college exist in parallel to a European one there 
is no systematised process in which the two colleges can exchange information with 
respect to the same financial institution. Until such framework is formed, cooperation 
with third countries can be ensured through Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), 
which would include, for instance, provisions for information sharing on a regular 
basis, periodic joint inspection exercises and confidentiality safeguards.
Finally, one of the crucial challenges for the ESAs will be to achieve strong con-
vergence in regular supervisory reporting requirements and accordingly, to promote 
the comparability of financial data across Member States. Progress has already been 
made in this field led in each sector by the relevant ESA. The EBA mandated COREP 
as the standardised reporting framework for credit institutions from 31 December 
2012.150 The EIOPA is currently developing harmonised reporting templates to meet 
requirements under the Solvency II Directive which would enhance the availability 
of supervisory information on insurance firms.151 Lastly, the ESMA set up a central 
depository (CEREP) to collect data on CRAs and is developing standards for report-
ing requirements.152
Commercial Data Providers
Existing commercial data providers, such as Datastream, offer information that can 
be utilised for macro-prudential analysis.153 The term ‘commercial data providers’ 
include trade repositories, credit registers, cheque and securities clearing systems 
and stock, futures and options exchanges.154 Each one of these is subject to a dif-
ferent legal framework and provides varied data that can enhance the ESRB infor-
mation base. 
149 According to the G-20 Declaration, Strengthening the Financial System—London Summit, (2 
Apr. 2009) 28 colleges for significant cross-border firms were in place at the time. The FSB was tasked 
with establishing the remaining supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms by June 2009. 
150 In accordance with Art. 74 of Directive 2006/48/EC as amended by Directive 2009/111/EC of 
16 September 2009. The EBA is currently working on the development of uniform reporting standards 
in accordance with Art. 74(2) of Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Art. 9(21) of Directive 2010/78/
EU of 24 November 2010): The EBA, Consultation Paper on Draft Implementing Technical Standards 
on Supervisory Reporting Requirements for Institutions (CP 50, 20 December 2011). 
151 The EIOPA, Consultation Paper on the Proposal on Quantitative Reporting Templates (CP-
11/009, 8 November 2011).
152 The ESMA Consultation Paper, ESMA’s draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the Presenta-
tion of the Information that Credit Rating Agencies Shall Disclose in Accordance with Art. 11(2) and 
point 1 of Part II of Section E of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (CP 304, 19 September 
2011).
153 Data from Datastream was analysed in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report, Grappling 
with Crisis Legacies (September 2011) (see Ch. 3: Toward Operationalizing Macroprudential Policies: 
When to Act?). 
154 Gareth Murphy and Robert Westwood, Data Gaps in the UK Financial Sector: Some Lessons 
Learned from the Recent Crisis (The Irving Fisher Conference on Data Gaps, Basel, 25–26 August 2010) 
<http://www.bis.org/ifc/events/5ifcconf/murphy.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
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While commercial data providers are potentially an essential rich source of infor-
mation for the ESRB information base, a number of reservations should be made 
regarding their usefulness for macro-prudential analysis. First, as the data may be 
privately owned, it may only be accessible at a cost.155 Secondly, these data may be 
available only with significant lags and they do not necessarily contain sufficient detail 
on essential items for macro-prudential analysis.156 Thirdly, it is unlikely that the 
ESRB will be able to piece together information from different sources as the avail-
able data is not always standardised and therefore such information would lack com-
parability. Finally, the integrity and security of the data can be put into question.157 
The following sections concentrate on the operation of trade repositories and credit 
registers and evaluate the current legal framework for channelling the data stored in 
these commercial data providers to the ESRB.158 It will be seen that at present the 
way the ESRB can access data stored in these sources is cumbersome and fragmented 
though with regard to trade repositories this may soon change. 
Trade Repositories
Trade repositories collect information on trades in over-the-counter (OTC) deriva-
tives i.e. those derivative products that are not traded on exchanges, but instead 
privately negotiated between two counterparts.159 The financial crisis highlighted 
deficiencies within the OTC derivatives markets, in particular lack of transparency 
and visibility of exposures available to both market participants and supervisors.160 
Moreover, the complex web of relationships in the OTC market meant that default 
155 But see below that data provided to regulators by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC) on credit and equity derivatives is free of charge. For more information refer to the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) <http://www.dtcc.com> accessed 16 April 2012.
156 Stephan Cecchetti, Ingo Fender and Patrick McGuire, Toward a Global Risk Map (2010), n74. 
157 For instance, voluntary reporting of hedge funds to commercial data providers may give rise to 
a self-selection bias (a proportion of good or bad performing hedge funds systemically avoiding report-
ing). The Centre of Hedge Fund Research, Imperial College, The Value of the Hedge Fund Industry 
to Investors, Markets and the Broader Economy (2012) < https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/Documents/
the-value-of-the-hedge-fund-industry-part-1.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. But see section 5 below on 
hedge funds reporting in the EU. 
158 Recently the ECB suggested to establish an EU Central Database on Euro Repos to enable moni-
toring of the segment in the shadow banking, see Vítor Constâncio, Towards Better Regulation of the 
Shadow Banking System (European Commission Conference, Brussels, 27 April 2012) http://www.ecb.
int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120427.en.html> accessed 16 April 2012. 
159 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2009–10, The Future 
 Regulation of Derivatives Markets: Is the EU On the Right Track? HL Paper 93 (2010) <http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/93/93.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; 
See also The Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 4 July 2012 on OTC Deriva-
tives, Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Trade Repositories COM (2010) 484 (hereinafter the EMIR), 
Art. 2.
160 The Commission, Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Commission Communication Ensuring 
Efficient, Safe and sound Derivatives Markets, SEC (2009) 905 final, p 9.
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of a major market participant could pose systemic risk to the financial system.161 
The only trade repository that existed when the financial crisis started in 2007 was 
the Trade Information Warehouse.162 It proved to be a very useful tool, after Lehm-
an’s default, for increasing transparency and reducing uncertainty in the Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) market, albeit with a delay.163 Following this positive expe-
rience additional trade repositories were launched to cover other segments of the 
OTC market.164 Currently, these trade repositories do not provide complete and 
comprehensive coverage of the entire OTC derivatives market165 and in order to 
gain access to the stored data the ESRB needs to sign MoUs with the national 
regulators of the trade depositories.166
This cumbersome way of accessing data stored in trade repositories may soon 
change. The Regulation (EU) 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties 
(CCPs) and Trade Repositories, known as the European Market Infrastructure Regu-
lation (hereinafter the EMIR) came into force on 16 August 2012.167 One of the key 
changes in the EMIR is the introduction of a mandatory requirement to report certain 
161 Particularly considering the extensive volume of trading in the OTC markets in the EU. In April 
2007, the EU accounted for 63% of the interest rates derivatives market and 54% of the foreign exchange 
derivatives market. In comparison, the US accounts for 24% and 15%, respectively BIS, Triennial 
Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2007 – Statistical Annex 
Tables 127 and 129<http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07a.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012.
162 The European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying docu-
ments to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC Deriva-
tives, Central CounterpArties and Trade Depositories, para. 3.3.1, SEC (2010) 1058. <http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/20100915_impact_assess ment_en.pdf> accessed 
10 November 2011.
163 Ibid. The Trade Information Warehouse was later renamed into the Warehouse Trust. Currently, 
it operates an online global regulators’ portal that gives global supervisors members of the OTC Deriva-
tives Regulators’ Forum (OTCDRF) access to data on credit and equity derivatives. As of November 
2011, nearly 40 regulators are using the portal. For more information refer to the DTCC website <http://
www.dtcc.com> accessed 16 April 2012. The access to the information stored in the Warehouse Trust 
complies with the Guidance set out by the OTCDRF in June 2010 <http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/
products/derivserv/ODRF_guidelines.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. 
164 One for interest rate derivatives and one for equity derivatives. TriOptima was selected by the 
ISDA Operations Steering Committee (OSC) as the provider of the former, while DTCC/Markiserve was 
chosen to run the latter, Impact Assessment Accompanying documents to the Proposal for a Regulation 
on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories para. 3.3.1 (n 144). The OSC is a 
consortium that includes 14 major dealers (the G14) in the OTC derivatives market, a number of buy-
side institutions and industry associations. See n 170 on other Trade Repositories in other segments of 
the OTC markets.
165 Impact Assessment Accompanying documents to the Proposal on OTC Derivatives, Central Coun-
terpArties and Trade Depositories para. 3.3.3 (n 162).The Warehouse Trust is the only one that comes 
close to full coverage of credit derivatives (CDs).
166 Ibid., para. 6.1.1 For instance – the available data on OTC derivatives is limited to OSC members. 
In segments, such as interest rates, where the weight of OSC members is significantly lower market 
coverage would be incomplete. 
167 The EMIR (n 159); In accordance with the communiqué of the G20 Summit at Pittsburgh in 
September 2009 that “All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 
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details of OTC derivative transactions in the EU to trade repositories.168 In addition, 
information on the risks inherent in OTC derivatives markets will be centrally stored 
and easily accessible to the relevant competent authorities.169 It is interesting to note 
here two amendments in the text adopted by the European Parliament on the 5th of 
July 2011: The first is that the ESRB was added in the list of entities that information 
stored in trade repositories will be made available to.170 The second amendment is the 
requirement that information will be available to these entities (and the ESRB among 
them) provided that the access to it is strictly necessary to enable them to fulfil their 
respective responsibilities and mandates.171 This amendment was in the spirit of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (hereinafter ‘the EDPS)’s opinion which raised 
concerns, inter alia, with regard to disclosure of personal data to the competent 
authorities and the failure to specify the purpose for which the information held by 
trade repositories can be accessed by the competent authorities.172 The EDPS empha-
sised in its opinion that even where the parties to the transaction are not natural per-
sons personal data may still be processed, such as the names and contact details of 
companies’ directors. This requirement was amended in the latest Council Text of 
the EMIR Proposal but did not find its way to the final text of the EMIR.173 Indeed, 
while it is crucial to ensure that the information being exchanged meets the propor-
tionality principle and that the purposes for which it can be processed are defined and 
limited,174 the added words “strictly necessary” could have proven to be an obstacle 
at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared 
contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements…”.
168 The EMIR (n 159), Art. 9. 
169 The EMIR (n 159), Art. 81.
170 The European Parliament amending (first reading) the proposal for a regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositor-
ies’ COD (2010) 0250, Art. 67(2)(aa). This is in accordance with the ECB Opinion, Amendment 45, 
OJ C/2011/57/1.
171 Ibid. See also Art. 67a of the Parliament amendments to the EMIR Proposal that requires trade 
repositories to be adequately organised in order to be in a position to give to the ESMA and relevant 
competent authorities direct and immediate access to the details of derivatives contracts.
172 The Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (the ‘EDPS’) on the proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties 
and trade repositories [2011] OJ C216/9 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C
:2011:216:0009:0016:EN:PDF> accessed 10 November 2011 (hereinafter the EDPS’ opinion), para. 27, 
requiring to include purpose limitation in the Art. 67. The wording ‘strictly necessary’ is derived from 
the principle of proportionality which is laid down in Art. 5 of the Treaty on European Union. The cri-
teria for applying it is set out in the Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality annexed to the Treaties.
173 The Council, Proposal for a Regulation on OTC Derivative Transactions, Central Counterparties 
and Trade Repositories, 2010/0250 (COD) (4 October 2011).
174 For examination of the European Court of Justice’s approach to the principle of proportional-
ity in data protection cases under Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data OJ L 281 p 31 
see Charlotte Bagger Tranberg, Proportionality and Data Protection in the Case law of the European 
Court of Justice 1 International Data Privacy Law 239–248 (2011). But see Jonas Christoffersen, Fair 
Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights 
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to the easy flow of information between trade repositories and the relevant authorities, 
including the ESRB. 
In view of the central role of trade repositories in collection of regulatory informa-
tion, the EMIR confers new powers on the ESMA as the sole authority with the 
responsibility to register and exercise surveillance of trade repositories in the EU.175 
The ESMA will ensure an unfettered access to all the relevant European authorities, 
including the ESRB to the data stored in the trade repositories and will act as the 
European contact point to deal with competent authorities of third countries trade 
repositories.176 Additionally, addressing the need for the information to be comparable 
across EU trade repositories, the ESMA will be responsible for development of 
regulatory technical standards specifying the details of the information to be dis-
closed.177 
The OTC market, by its very nature, is global and therefore it is crucial to ensure 
that there are no legal obstacles in place that would prevent an effective mutual 
exchange of information and that there is an unfettered access to data maintained in 
a trade repository located in a third country.178 Addressing the need for supervisory 
and regulatory convergence, the EMIR stipulates that where a trade repository is 
established in a third country, there is a need to conclude an international agreement 
for the trade repository to be recognised by the ESMA.179 Moreover, the EMIR recog-
nises the importance of ensuring international convergence of requirements for trade 
repositories reporting180 Unfortunately, U.S. and EU supervisors are facing difficulties 
in finding common ground, despite their recognition of the importance of international 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) on the general rejection of the European Court of Human rights 
the principle of strict necessity. In particular, the author points out that necessity is not as flexible as 
other terms, such as reasonable
175 The EMIR (n 159), Arts 55, 71 and 73. 
176 The EMIR (n 159), Art. 75–77 and 84. The EDPS has also raised concerns regarding the vast 
powers entrusted with the ESMA (n 172). See also the FSA and HM Treasury, Reforming OTC Deriv-
atives Markets, A UK Perspective (December 2009) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_
derivatives.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
177 The EMIR (n 149), Art. 81. The Parliament amended this Article to include operational standards 
that are required in order to aggregate and compare data across trade repositories and when necessary 
for the authorities to have access to that information (n 151). This amendment did not appear in the 
Council text. 
178 Sally Davies, Cross-border Derivatives Exposures: How Global are Derivatives Markets? (July 
2009) <http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb31n.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. 
179 The EMIR (n 149), Arts 75–76. As well as the requirement to be recognised by the Commission, 
as having an equivalent and enforceable regulatory and supervisory framework and has established co-
operation arrangements with the Union pursuant to Art. 62(3) to ensure that Union authorities, including 
ESMA, have immediate and continuous access to all the necessary information.
180 The EMIR (n 159), Preamble 90. To promote the international convergence in this area the 
DTCC was selected by ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association), the AFME (Associa-
tion for Financial Markets in Europe) and the Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Associa-
tion to be the service provider of global trade repositories for Interest Rates, Commodities and Foreign 
Exchange derivatives, adding to its already existing repositories for Credit and Equity derivatives, for 
more detail see the DTCC website <http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/suite/global_trade_reposi-
tory_for_otc_derivs.php> accessed 16 April 2012. 
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cooperation in a global market, such as the OTC derivatives one. The source of the 
disagreement is section 763(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires any U.S. or foreign 
authority, other than the SEC, seeking to obtain data from a security-based swap data 
repository to agree to provide indemnification to the security-based swap data repos-
itory and the SEC “for any expenses arising from litigation relating to the information 
provided”.181 The ESMA expressed its concerns with regard to this indemnification 
requirement and strongly stated that it undermines the key principle of trust according 
to which exchange of information should occur between the authorities. These regu-
latory barriers based on the location of trade repositories can result in the establish-
ment of separate local trade repositories in various jurisdictions. A multiple system 
of trade repositories is clearly inefficient as it forces supervisors to interact with dif-
ferent trade repositories and may result in fragmentation of the data available to 
supervisors.182 Consequently, the SEC has recommended recently the Congress to 
remove the indemnification requirement while ensuring confidentiality is preserved.183
The proposed regional legislation in this area should be viewed in the context of 
other international initiatives, such as the creation of the OTC Derivatives Regulators’ 
Forum (the ‘OTCDRF’) in September 2009.184 The forum comprised of international 
financial regulators, with the aim of coordinating and articulating information needs 
of the regulatory community in OTC derivatives markets and designing and imple-
menting common reporting expectations from CCPs and trade repositories.
Credit Registers
At present credit registers exist in all EU Member States, either in the form of 
public registers (there are 14 in the EU) or private credit bureaus (22 of them).185 
Public credit registers are typically run by central banks or supervisory authorities. 
181 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Public Law No 111–203 enacted 
on July 21, 2010).
182 The ESMA, Rulemakings on Registration of Non-resident Swap Data Repositories (17 January 
2011) <http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-35-10/s73510-19.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012.
183 Ethiopis Tafara Director in the Office of International Affairs U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Testimony Concerning Indemnification of Security-Based Swap Data Repositories before 
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, United States House 
of Representatives on 21 March 2012 <http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts032112et.htm> 
accessed 16 April 2012.
184 More information on this forum can be found at http://otcdrf.org, in particular see the Frame-
work for Information Sharing and Cooperation among OTC Derivatives Regulators (22 September 
2009) <http://www.otcdrf.org/documents/framework_sept2009.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. For 
further information on the global convergence of OTC Reporting see the FSB Report, Implement-
ing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms (25 October, 2010) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_101025.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012; CPSS-IOSCO – Consultative Report on Data 
Reporting and Aggregation Requirements (August 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss96.pdf> accessed 
16 April 2012. 
185 ECB, Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information Among National Cen-
tral Credit Registers for the Purpose of Passing it on to Reporting Institutions (Frankfurt, April 2010) 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/memoxinccreditregisters201004en.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
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Reporting to public credit registers is a legal obligation and they operate on a non-
profit basis. Private credit registers, on the other hand, have varied membership 
structures and are mainly for-profit.186
The objectives of the credit registers typically include providing information for 
lenders’ due diligence, banking statistics and financial stability.187 There is a correla-
tion between the most dominant objective amongst these and the reporting threshold: 
the higher the threshold is, the more dominant the financial stability objective will 
be. As might be expected, EU Member States differ widely in the data collected by 
credit registers and their threshold of the mandatory disclosure in their public credit 
registers. For instance, in Portugal the reporting threshold is very low (€50) as opposed 
to Germany (€1.5 million) and accordingly the ability to utilise the information gath-
ered for macro-prudential analysis differs.188
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for regular exchange of information 
between several central banks in the EU with respect to large corporate borrowers (at 
least €25,000) was initially set up in 2003 and amended in 2010.189 As its name sug-
gests, however, the main purpose of the MoU is to allow reporting institutions to 
obtain a more complete overview of the indebtedness of a borrower. The preamble 
indeed states that public credit registers provide useful additional information to 
supervisory authorities on credit concentration but no further reference is made for 
exchange of information with the respective supervisory authorities of the parties. 
Furthermore, it seems that the operation of the MoU is somewhat disappointing and 
that the exchange of information is limited and cumbersome.190 
The Issing Committee, mandated by the G-20 to provide recommendations for a 
new financial order, recommended in its 2009 report establishing a supra-national 
credit register that will bring a standardisation across countries and will allow super-
visors to improve their financial stability role.191 Ironically, at the same year, the 
Experts Group on Credit Histories mandated by the European Commission rejected 
the idea of creating a single pan-European retail credit register, at least for the fore-
seeable future, for being time consuming and costly.192 The Expert Group briefly noted 
that the situation could be appreciated differently when dealing with corporate cred-
it.193 Weighing the benefits of data maintained in credit registers on corporate credit 
as one of the tools of supervisors for global monitoring of systemic risks against the 
costs of establishing such an entity the balance may indeed support the view of the 
Issing Committee.
186 Report of the Expert Group on Credit Histories mandated by COM (2008) 543 (15 May 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/credit_histories/egch_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011, para. 3.1.
187 The Issing Recommendations (n 78), para. 3.1 
188 Ibid., para. 3.2.
189 The MoU on the Exchange of Information (n 185), para. 3.
190 The Issing Recommendations (n 78), para. 3.2.
191 Ibid., para. 3.5.
192 The Report of the Expert Group (n 186), para. 4.1.5 
193 Ibid., fn 28 on p 25.
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In the absence of a single credit register in the EU and an efficient framework for 
exchange of information amongst credit registers for supervisory purposes, there is 
a need to set up a framework for cooperation between the ESRB and EU national 
central banks and their respective public credit registers and, where necessary, with 
private credit bureaus. The information gathered via these channels can provide the 
ESRB with a valuable input in the assessment of systemic importance of financial 
institutions and the surveillance of shadow banking.194 Ultimately, harmonisation of 
the rules concerning credit registers is needed to provide comparable platform of data 
collection for macro and micro-prudential supervision.
Finally, EU Member States should endeavour to implement the General Principles 
for Credit Reporting published by the World Bank in March 2011 in their jurisdic-
tions and in particular, principle 5 that deals with cross’ border data flow.195 Principle 
5 emphasises the importance of standardisation of information and cooperation and 
coordination between the relevant regulators initially through periodic meetings (e.g. 
annual or semi-annual) and later on through MoUs. 
Market Intelligence
Thus far this Article has looked critically at the exchange of information process 
between the ESRB and various defined data sources: European central banks, inter-
national institutions, the ESAs and other commercial data providers. These organ-
isational sources, though comprehensive when combined, are still insufficient in 
providing a full and accurate picture of emerging risks in the EU. They lack the 
fluidity that is required to maintain a data collection process which is forward-
looking and evolving.196 They are constrained with legal obstacles, national inter-
ests and institutional cooperation. Moreover, these sources produce quantitative 
data and it has been acknowledged that given the nature of financial crises the 
statistical ability to predict them is limited.197 Hence, continuous dialogue with a 
wide spectrum of market participants is a requisite for macro-prudential surveil-
lance and will allow the ESRB to keep track of financial innovations and to main-
tain the non-regulated or lightly regulated areas under its radar.198
194 Both of these areas will be further explored below in section 5. See, for instance, Matias Gutièr-
rez Girault and Jane Hwang, Public Credit Registers as a Tool for Bank Regulation and Supervision, 
The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5489 (2010).
195 The World Bank Task Force, General Principles for Credit Reporting, Consultative Report 
(March 2011) <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTO
R/0,,contentMDK:22912648~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282885,00.html> accessed 10 
November 2011.
196 Yet, it still involves an historic overlook, indicating the build up of risks over time. For the time 
dimension of systemic risks see n 37 above.
197 IMF, Macroprudential Policy: an Organising Framewor’(14 March 2011) <http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2011/031411.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
198 See for instance the Bank of England, Instruments of Macroprudential Policy, a Discussion 
Paper (December 2011) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financial-
stability/discussionpaper111220.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011 indicating that market intelligence 
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The ESRB will operate its own market intelligence research through private stake-
holders. These include financial sector representatives, consumers associations and 
users groups in the financial services area established by the commission or by Union 
legislation.199 Collection of data in this area is usually done through surveys and 
industry round tables and it is to be assumed that the ESRB will pay the participating 
private stakeholders for their services. Bearing in mind that the ECB already has a 
long history with private stakeholders, its involvement in developing market intelli-
gence networks with the ESRB is essential. The ESRB market intelligence can be 
complemented by information gathered through the ECB market intelligence, which 
is already being utilised for the ECB Financial Stability Review.200
Given the wide nature of systemic risk market intelligence in this context should 
not be narrowly interpreted to include only private stakeholders from the financial 
industry. The ESRB needs to develop an interdisciplinary collaboration with stake-
holders outside the financial circles in order to identify and evaluate the impact of 
other policy areas on the build-up of systemic risks in the financial markets. For 
instance, a letter that was addressed recently to the ESRB highlighted the systemic 
risk that the EU’s exposure to high carbon investments might pose to the financial 
system.201 The signatories of the letter included academics, politicians and other non-
profit organisations, such as Greenpeace UK. They stressed that with the transition 
to a low carbon economy, deploying significant amounts of capital by banks202 into 
high carbon sectors or in companies with significant exposure to them can pose sys-
temic risk to the financial system. It was contended that at present the exposure to 
high carbon investments in the financial markets, particularly in bank loan books, is 
not fully appreciated and monitored and there is no view on what level would be too 
high.203 The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee agreed that there is scope 
for further evaluation of this issue and put it on its agenda for discussion204.
recently pointed towards the rapid growth and evolution of the exchange-traded funds industry and well 
before the crisis, it highlighted the risks involved in collateralised debt obligations.
199 The ESRB Regulation, Art. 14 and para. 29 in the Preamble. 
200 Eg ECB, The Financial Stability Review (June 2011) <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/finan-
cialstabilityreview201106en.pdf> accessed November 2011.
201 A letter addressed to the Mario Adraghi, Chair of the ESRB, February 2012 <http://www.capi-
talinstitute.org/sites/capitalinstitute.org/files/docs/Letter%20to%20European%20Systemic%20Risk%20
Board%20-%2002.2012.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. See also Ben Caldecott, ‘Why High Carbon 
Investment could be the Next Sub-prime Crisis’ (The Guardian, 12 July 2011) <http://www.guard 
ian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/12/high-carbon-investment> accessed 16 April 2012; This letter fol-
lowed a similar letter addressed to the Bank of England Governor, Sir Mervyn King in January 2012 
<http://www.climatechangecapital.com/media/256968/letter%20to%20bank%20of%20england%20
financial%20policy%20committee%20-%2019th%20january%202012%20-%20final.pdf> accessed 16 
April 2012.
202 As well as institutional investors, companies, mutual funds and retail investors.
203 A letter to the ESRB on high carbon investment exposures (n 201). 
204 Bank of England, the Financial Policy Committee, a letter addressed to James Cameron, dated 
1 February 2012 <http://www.climatechangecapital.com/media/257552/fpc%20bank%20of%20eng 
land%20response.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. 
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Finally, a cautionary note should be made regarding the quality of data gathered 
through market intelligence. The reliability and accuracy of the information can be 
put into question as private stakeholders are not necessarily regulated and their views 
are in their nature subjective and may be motivated by self interest. Clearly though 
the need to keep the finger on the pulse and be informed of both financial innovations 
and other policy areas that may affect the financial markets outweigh these problems. 
The ESRB as a Central Hub: Collecting Data from a Wide ‘Information Base’
The ESRB is facing a very intimidating task of collecting slices of data from dif-
ferent sources and creating a unified and clear puzzle of the financial system in the 
EU and its emerging risks. It is not a one-off exercise but rather a continuous and 
evolving one, adjusted from time to time to fit the fast changing market demands. 
The ESRB operates in this environment as a central hub, ensuring smooth flow of 
information from central banks, the ESAs and the Members States supervisory author-
ities. Its information base includes other data sources ranging from commercial data 
providers, market participants and most importantly, international institutions. 
Much of the ESRB success relies on the openness of each one of these channels: 
the smooth flow of data from financial institutions to national supervisors and central 
banks, from national supervisors to the ESAs and from the ESAs to the ESRB. The 
operation of the European colleges of supervisors and the willingness of its members 
to cooperate will play a major role in this flow. 
Assuming the frameworks are operating efficiently and any identified obstacles to 
the smooth flow of information are removed, as suggested in this section, the ESRB 
will have an unfettered access to micro-prudential data through the ESAs and macro-
prudential data through the ECB. Overall, its information base is comprehensive 
enough to view the inter-linkages in the financial system within the EU and granular 
enough to enable it to take action before systemic risks emerge or at least mitigate 
them soon after their emergence. 
5. Collecting Information on Shadow Banking and Systematically Important 
Financial Institutions
As part of its evolving data collection exercise, the ESRB is currently focusing on 
two pressing areas: collecting information from the so-called shadow banking and 
prioritising collection of information from Systematically Important Financial Insti-
tutions. These will be examined in more detail in this section. 
Is Shadow Banking Still in the Shadow?
The term “shadow banking system” began to be used widely at the onset of the 
2007–2008 financial crisis referring to entities and activities structured outside the 
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regular banking system that perform bank-like functions.205 These institutions, 
vehicles, instruments and markets are largely engaged in replicating the core activ-
ity of traditional banking, credit and maturity transformation.206 In the midst of the 
financial crisis it became clear that the shadow banking system can become a 
source of systemic risk, both directly and indirectly through its interconnectedness 
with the regular banking system.207 This threat was exacerbated by the fact that 
some components of the system remained outside the radar of the supervisory 
authorities and often excluded from their data collection frameworks. It also 
entailed the danger of creating opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine 
stricter bank regulation and lead to a build-up of additional risks in the system.208 
This, however, is changing very rapidly as international institutions, in particular 
the FSB and the BIS, are focusing their efforts on identifying information gaps and 
exploring possible regulatory measures to address systemic risks and regulatory 
arbitrage concerns posed by the shadow banking system.209 As yet there is no clear 
commonly-agreed definition of the system. Given its fluid and evolving nature, 
casting the net wide is a prerequisite for such a definition in order to identify and 
capture any adaptations or mutations that may be of potential concern for the finan-
cial system.210 Major actors in the shadow banking system include structured invest-
ment vehicles, hedge funds and money-market funds.211 Hedge funds and Money 
market funds will be the centre of our discussion. Their selection is based on the 
fact that there is a piece of legislation regulating their operation and is not neces-
sarily correlated to the potential systemic risks they pose on the financial system, 
as this may change at any given time.212 
205 The FSB, Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues, a Background Note (12 April 2011) <http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. The exact 
definition in this background note is “intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system” at p 1.
206 Vitor Constâncio (n 91). According to the FSB Background Note on Shadow Banking (n 195) 
“Maturity transformation” is the activity of issuing short term liabilities (such as deposits) and trans-
forming them into medium–long term assets (such as loans). It is to be noted that according to the 
background note the core activity could include “Liquidity transformation”, ie the issuing of liquid 
liabilities to finance illiquid assets. An asset is illiquid when it cannot be easily converted into cash 
without a loss in nominal value. The FSB estimated the size of the global shadow banking system at 
around € 46 trillion in 2010 (having grown from € 21 trillion in 2002). This represents between 25% 
and 30% of the total financial system and half the size of bank assets. FSB, Strengthening Oversight 
and Regulation, Recommendations of the FSB (27 October 2011) < http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_111027a.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012. 
207 The FSB Background Note on Shadow Banking at ‘Introduction’ (n 205). European Commission, 
Green Paper, Shadow Banking (Brussels, 19 March 2012) COM(2012) 102 final.
208 Ibid., at ‘Introduction’.
209 Eg Nicholas Vause, Enhanced BIS Statistics on Credit Risk Transfer, The BIS Quarterly Review 
(December 2011), <http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1112i.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011 reports 
that recent BIS credit derivatives statistics suggested that reporting dealers have used some hard- 
to-value credit derivatives to transfer credit risk to shadow banks.
210 The FSB Background Note on Shadow Banking (n 205), para. 1.
211 Vitor Constâncio (n 91).
212 For the potential systemic risk of hedge funds see Andrew W Lo, The Feasibility of Systemic 
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The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), which entered 
into force on 21 July 2011, brought hedge funds and other investment funds under 
the spotlight.213 The mechanism for exchange of information relating to the potential 
systemic consequences of AIFM activity is found in Art. 53 of the AIFMD. Article 
53(1) provides that the competent authorities responsible for the authorisation and/or 
supervision of AIFMs will communicate to the ESRB information that is relevant for 
monitoring and responding to the potential implications of the AIFMs for the stabil-
ity of systemically relevant financial institutions and the orderly functioning of mar-
kets on which AIFMs are active.214 Article 53(2) places an obligation on the 
competent authorities of the AIFMs to communicate to the ESRB aggregated infor-
mation relating to the activities of the AIFMs under their responsibilities.215 Articles 
53(3) and 53(4) specify the methods for adoption of measures specifying the content, 
modalities and frequency of the information to be exchanged. In addition, Art. 25 of 
the AIFMD requires competent authorities to share information on the levels of lever-
age in AIFs managed by AIFMs with the ESRB.216 Thus the AIFMD equips national 
supervisors and the ESRB with the information necessary to monitor and respond to 
risks to the stability of the financial system that could be caused or amplified by AIFs’ 
activity. 
Money market funds (MMFs), as opposed to hedge funds, do not engage in matu-
rity transformation, however they are inherently fragile and can pose a potential threat 
for the functioning of the financial system as well.217 MMFs are regulated under a 
Risk Measurement: Written Testimony for the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on Systemic 
Risk Regulation (19 October 2009) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1497682> accessed 10 November 2011; 
For a different view see Andrew Baker, ‘Hedge Funds are not Shadow Banks’ (FT.com, 15 May 2011) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/611b8e26-7d8d-11e0-b418-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iZjp3LJN> accessed 
10 November 2011.
213 Council Directive 2011/61/EU of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 
1095/2010 [2011] OJ L174/1 (hereinafter the AIFMD). EU Member States are required to transpose 
the AIFMD by 22 July 2013. For the definition of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) and Alternative 
Investment Funds Managers (AIFMs) see AIFMD, Art. 4. AIFMs include not only mangers of hedge 
funds but also, among others, private equity funds, commodity funds, real estate funds and infrastruc-
ture funds. See the Proposal for a Directive on alternative Investment Fund Managers COM(2009) 
207 final, para. 1.1. To portrait an accurate picture of the regulatory environment it is crucial to point 
out that hedge funds have been under the UK regulators inspected eye long before the beginning of 
the financial crisis, see for instance Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation Law and 
Financial Market Review (2011); Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8/2011 at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1757719 > accessed 10 November 2011.
214 And ESMA and the competent authorities or other member states.
215 Subject to Art. 35 of the ESMA Regulation.
216 And the ESMA and other authorities
217 Christian Weistroffer, Identifying Systematically Important Financial Institutions (Deutsche Bank 
Research, Frankfurt am Main, August 2011) <http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000276722.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. Sometimes the term “breaks the 
buck” is used to describe a situation where the value of securities held in MMF falls below par. In 16th 
of September, 2008 one of the oldest and largest money market funds in the U.S. – the Reserve Primary 
Fund – broke the buck. It was the only MMF that broke the buck during the 2008 financial crisis – see 
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different European piece of legislation, the Undertakings for Collective Investment 
in Transferable Securities Directive (the UCITS Directive).218 As opposed to the 
AIFMD, the UCITS Directive aims solely at investors’ protection and promoting 
transparency to the public and does not provide the ESRB with any specific tools to 
covering MMFs under its data collection umbrella. 
Bringing the shadow banking system into the perimeter of financial regulation in 
the same manner done in the AIFMD will assist the ESRB in establishing a stream 
of timely and comparable information. However, markets have a clear tendency to 
continuously shift their activities outside the regulatory realm. The introduction of 
more stringent capital requirements in the EU may exacerbate this tendency. The 
ESRB cannot rely on the legislator’s efforts in ensuring the shadow banking system 
is regulated. Its supervision has to be independent from these efforts, though wel-
comed. Indeed, the ESRB objectives and tasks are worded widely to encompass 
shadow banking and other financial institutions219 and allow it to meet this challenge. 
The ESRB needs to constantly adapt its data collection exercise in order to reflect the 
fluidity of the financial markets operation. Market intelligence built on regular dia-
logue with market participants will play a key role in this chase.220 Information col-
lected through market intelligence will be useful in providing the ESRB with a 
forward-looking perspective so that it can anticipate developments and identify 
emerging risks in the early stages of their inception.221 The ESRB’s work in this area 
should aim to develop a better understanding of the interconnections between entities 
within the shadow banking system and regulated banks as well as identifying entities 
or activities within this system that may be sources of systemic risk.
Diya Gullapalli and others, ‘Money Fund, Hurt by Debt Tied to Lehman, Breaks the Buck’, Wall Street 
Journal, 17 September 2008. The ESRB has recently issued recommendation on MMFs highlighting 
their potential to spread, or even amplify, a crisis due to their susceptibility to investor runs. It recom-
mended the Commission to ensure that the relevant Union legislation enhances regular harmonised 
reporting obligations by MMFs and promotes the organisation of information sharing between national 
supervisory authorities and, inter alia, the ESRB. See Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk 
Board of 20 December 2012 on money market funds(ESRB/2012/1).
218 Council Directive 2009/65/EC of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
[2011] OJ L302/32 (hereinafter “the UCITS”); On July 2011 the Guidelines on a Common Definition 
of European MMFs that were issued in May 2010 by the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(the predecessor of the ESMA) CESR/ 10- 049 came into force (hereinafter “the MMFs Guidelines”); 
In August 2011 the ESMA released a Q&A document that provides guidance on the MMFs Guidelines
219 Article 2(b) of the ESRB Regulation defines widely “financial system” to include not only all 
financial institutions (see definition in Art. 2(a)) but also all markets, products and market infrastruc-
tures. See also Bart PM Joosen, The Limitations of Regulating Macro-prudential Supervision in Europe 
25 J.I.B.L.R. 493–501 (2010).
220 For an example of the use of market intelligence to identify risks in the shadow banking system 
see James O’Connor, James Wackett and Robert Zammit, The Use of Foreign Exchange Markets by 
Non-Banks 51(2) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 119 (2011) <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/quArterlybulletin/qb110204.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011 .
221 The FSB Background Note on Shadow Banking (n 205), para. 2.1.
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Systematically Important Financial Institutions
Another pressing issue on the ESRB’s agenda is the monitoring of Systematically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The first hurdle is to identify these institu-
tions and here the ESRB can follow the guidance provided by the IMF, the BIS 
and FSB and the criteria put forward recently for consultation by the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on Global Systematically Important Banks 
(G-SIB).222 The key factors according to which systemic importance of markets and 
institutions should be identified are size (the volume of financial services provided 
by it), substitutability (the extent to which other components of the system can 
provide the same services in the event of failure) and interconnectedness (linkages 
with other components of the system).223 
Three observations can be made regarding data collection on SIFIs that requires 
careful consideration. The first is that the ECB has the right to collect statistical infor-
mation from the ‘reference reporting population’ as defined in the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2533/98 and of what is necessary to carry out the tasks of the ESCB224. 
Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 requires the ECB to specify the ‘actual 
reporting population’ within the limits of the reference reporting population. The 
actual reporting population cover, inter alia, all credit institutions resident in the euro 
area, including branches and subsidiaries whose headquarters are located outside the 
euro area.225 Conversely, data of branches or subsidiaries of euro area established 
222 IMF, BIS and FSB, Report to G-20 Finance Ministers and Governors-Guidance to Assess the 
Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations (28 
October 2009) <www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107c.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2011; FSB, Recommendations and Timelines, Reducing Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Impor-
tant Financial Institutions (20 October 2010) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_101111a.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011; The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
A Consultative Document: Global Systematically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and the 
Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement (BIS, July 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201.pdf> 
accessed 10 November 2011.
223 The ESRB Regulation, Preamble, s 9. The preamble emphasises that an assessment based on 
these key criteria should be complemented by reference to other considerations and factors, such as, inter 
alia, complexity and intensity and scope of supervision. For G-SIBs criteria the BCBS adds complex-
ity and cross jurisdictional (the BCBS G-SIBs Assessment Methodology, n 212). It is to be noted that 
this is the only reference to SIFIs that can be found in the ESRB Regulation. The ESRB is not specifi-
cally assigned the power to designate institutions as systematically important and it is not listed in its 
tasks in Art. 3 of the ESRB Regulation. In addition, there is no definition of systematically important 
and systemic importance in the ESRB Regulation (see for instance the Dodd-Frank Act, Art. 803(9)).
224 Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 Concerning the Collection of Statistical 
Information by the European Central Bank, OJ L318/8. as last amended by the Council Regulation 
(EC) 951/2009. 
225 Regulation of the ECB (EC) No 2423/2001 of 22 November 2001 concerning the Consolidated 
Balance Sheet of the Monetary Financial Institution Sector (ECB/2001/13) OJ L 333/1. Credit insti-
tutions” are defined as any institution falling under the definition contained in the 2000/12 Directive 
(EC) of 20 March 2000, as amended “(a) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or (b) an electronic money 
institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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outside the jurisdiction of EU Member States are excluded. Accordingly, the remits 
of the ESRB data collection is restricted. In practical terms it means that the ESRB 
does not have access through the ECB to data on SIFIs established outside the EU 
even though they may have significant activity within the euro area. Relevant data on 
these institutions will therefore need to be collected from other data sources which 
may entail setting up the necessary legal arrangements. 
The second is that international dimension of the activity of these institutions226 
suggests that the collection of information on the SIFIs by the ESRB will need to be 
conducted in synergy with other international institutions and through smooth coop-
eration with supervisory colleges outside the EU, as discussed in section 4.
The last observation concerns the disclosure of the fact that an institution is con-
sidered a SIFI. Here the ECB and the ESRB are found between the devil and the deep 
blue sea. On the one hand, there is a need to collect more granular statistics in order 
to analyse SIFIs and their interlinkages. On the other hand, disclosing which institu-
tion is a SIFI and subjecting it to targeted reporting obligations may lead to increased 
moral hazard and would leave room for regulatory arbitrage.227 The solution to this 
dilemma was presented recently in a form of a 3 tier system.228 Tier 1 will include all 
the banking and insurance groups, which are subject to reporting obligations to the 
ECB.229 Tier 2 will consist of large banking and insurance groups, defined according 
to a simple asset threshold value that will be publicly available for reporting purpos-
es.230 Tier 3 will comprise SIFIs, identified internally according to the G-20 terminol-
of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions”.
226 Stijn Claessens and others, A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Sys-
temic Institutions (12th Geneva Report on the World Economy, CEPR, London, 2010); <http://personal.
vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Geneva12.pdf> accessed on 10 November 2011 observed that on average, the 
thirty largest SIFIs have 53% of their assets abroad and have close to 1000 subsidiaries, of which 68% 
operate abroad. Frenklin Allen and others, Cross Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial 
Stability and Macroeconomic Policies (Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2011) <http://
www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/cross-border_banking.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011 further 
observed that the European banks on this list were far more internationalised than the North American 
or Asian institutions.
227 Moral hazard is the expectation that due to its importance the institution will be bailed out or 
assisted when facing financial difficulty (‘too big to fail’ or ‘too important to fail’). On moral hazard 
posed by SIFIs see FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard by Systematically Important Financial Institutions-
Interim Report to G-20 Leaders (18 June 2010) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_100627b.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. Identifying institutions as SIFIs may result in downsizing 
and shedding of certain activities. It could potentially mean the fragmentation of activities and their 
transfer to smaller participants. Many smaller-sized financial institutions with similar risk profiles can 
render them ‘systemic in a herd’ and can result in a systemic crisis all the same. See Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, Basel 3 and Beyond: Systematically Important Financial Institutions (November 2011).
228 Agresti Anna Maria and others, Enhancement to ECB statistics for Financial Stability Analysis 
Irving Fisher Committee Bulletin No 34 (November 2011) < http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb34.pdf > 
accessed 16 April 2012. 
229 See the first observation above. 
230 Around 100 large banking groups and 50 large insurance groups, Agresti Anna Maria (n 217), 
p 23.
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ogy discussed above and will not be publicly available.231 This system will enable the 
ECB (and the ESRB) to collect all relevant information while reducing the risk of 
moral hazard in identifying SIFIs. Regrettably, the ECB currently focuses on banking 
and insurance groups.232 The importance of other financial institutions and their con-
tribution to system risk was already discussed in section 4 and their inclusion in the 
tier system is necessary to conduct a reliable macro-prudential supervision. 
6. Collecting Information is Only the First Step
Collecting the relevant information is a prerequisite to fulfilling the ESRB role of 
identifying and mitigating systemic risks. Once the information is available the data 
still needs to be analysed. The analysis stage suffers (even more than other aspects 
of the ESRB data collection process) from limited amount of evidence that is pub-
licly available. It raises, however, a few questions which have a direct impact on 
the data collection stage – which model/models will the ESRB use for its macro-
prudential analysis? Particularly at the initial stage, will various models be used 
until their effectiveness can be tested? The answers to these questions are signifi-
cant to determining the data needs of the ESRB, as different models require differ-
ent data sets to be collected. It is to be assumed that because macro-prudential 
analysis is still in its infancy, a multiplicity of approaches will initially be employed.233 
Before concluding, it is important to bear in mind that analysis is not an objective 
in itself but rather a means to an end, ie producing corrective action where necessary, 
in the form of warnings and recommendations. As Claudio Borio of the BIS put it, 
“The main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the failure to interpret 
them correctly and to take remedial action”.234 
7. Conclusions
Data are the eyes and ears we use to see and hear what is happening in the finan-
cial and economic world. Without it, we are deaf, blind and dumb.235 The need for 
231 It is likely that Tier 3 will be a subset of Tier 2. Ibid., p 23. In November 2011 the FSB and 
BCBS have identified an initial group of 29 globally systemically important banks, see the FSB, Policy 
Measures to Address Systematically Important Financial Institutions (G-20 Cannes Summit, 4 Novem-
ber 2011) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf> accessed 16 April 
2012. Interestingly, European banks dominate the list with 17 banks.
232 Agresti Anna Maria (n 228), p 21.
233 Lucas Papademos, Financial Stability and Macro Prudential Supervision: Objectives, Instru-
ments and Role of the ECB (“The ECB and Its Watchers XI” Conference, Frankfurt, 4 September 
2009) <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090904_3.en.html> accessed 10 November 2011.
234 Claudio Borio, The Financial Crisis: What Implications for New Statistics? (BIS, 25 August 
2010) <http://www.bis.org/ifc/events/5ifcconf/keynotecborio.pdf> accessed 16 April 2012.
235 Cecchetti, Fender and McGuire (n 74), p 1.
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data is especially acute in macro-prudential surveillance where a bird’s eye perspec-
tive can be achieved by combining macro as well as aggregated micro-prudential 
data sets across countries, sectors and financial instruments. 
This Article has sought to consider this fascinating aspect of ESRB’s macro-pru-
dential oversight. It assessed whether the ESRB has in place a well-functioning data 
collection process designed to produce, where necessary, concrete warnings and 
remedial recommendations regarding risks to the financial stability within the EU. 
The broad conclusion is that there are indeed various challenges and possible 
obstacles to smooth flow of information both in the legal frameworks and the practi-
cal mechanisms of the data collection process. Yet, the ESRB’s information base and 
its data collection mandate are wide enough to tailor its macro-prudential analysis 
needs and are far from being a duplicating effort of other national and international 
players.236 Existing players, such as the ESCB, the ECB, the FSB, the BIS and the 
IMF, collected an overwhelming amount of financial data long before the onset of the 
2008 financial crisis. These data were not necessarily tailored for macro-prudential 
analysis or aimed at producing concrete warnings and remedial recommendations. 
Initiatives taken recently to adapt and enhance their data sets so as to fit macro-pru-
dential analysis needs are welcomed. They will significantly assist the ESRB, given 
the global dimension of systemic risks. However, an EU focused data collection 
framework is still indispensable. The ESRB has direct access, through the ESAs, to 
the necessary micro-prudential data on the financial system within the EU. Further-
more, over time, the ESRB’s data collection process will benefit from higher quality 
data, as the ongoing increased integration within the EU and the creation of a single 
rulebook237 will act as a catalyst for the creation of a consistent and comparable finan-
cial reporting. Describing the ESRB as a ‘toothless’ ‘talking shop’, which will dupli-
cate activities already undertaken by other national and international institutions238 
lacks fundamental understanding of the demanding requirements of data collection 
for the purpose of macro-prudential supervision. This observation ignores the need 
for micro-prudential data which is granular enough to enable the ESRB to take action 
before systemic risks emerge or at least mitigate them. It also ignores the need for the 
data to be comparable, particularly where so many data sources are involved.
The various impediments to a well-functioning data collection process were high-
lighted by examining the various channels and data sources. Each one of these chan-
nels operates within a different legal framework and, consequently, presents unique 
challenges for the ESRB in its data collection. Accordingly, the solutions suggested 
in this Article to refine the process differ from one source to another. For the immedi-
236 The Treasury Committee, Opinion on the Proposals for European Financial Supervision (Six-
teenth Report of Session 2008–2009), para. 49 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/
cmselect/cmtreasy/1088/1088.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
237 The Conclusions of the European Council 19 June 2009 D/09/2 confirmed the role of the ESAs 
in establishing a single rule book applicable to all financial institutions in the single market, see for 
instance, Art. 8 of the EBA Regulation.
238 The Treasury Committee, Opinion on the Proposals for European Financial Supervision (Six-
teenth Report of Session 2008–2009), para. 49 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/
cmselect/cmtreasy/1088/1088.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011.
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ate future, it is suggested to promote regular exchange of aggregate information by 
the ESCB in the same manner already being provided between the ESRB and the 
ECB. It is also suggested to establish guidelines with the ESAs outlining criteria for 
handling “reasoned” requests submitted by the ESRB; In time it will be essential to 
tackle more intimidating tasks: finalising agreements with international institutions 
relating to the exchange of information and in particular the confidentiality regime to 
be applied; rectifying impediments to the smooth flow of information within the col-
leges of supervisors ensuring that the coordination and cooperation process within 
this framework is maximised. Updating the Colleges Guidelines, as suggested in sec-
tion 4, could well be the first step to accomplishing this task. The parallel and at times 
overlapping frameworks of international and European colleges of supervisors will 
also need to be dealt with in the longer run. A short term solution was suggested to 
ensure cooperation with third countries through MoUs, covering issues such as infor-
mation sharing on a regular basis, periodic joint inspection exercises and confidenti-
ality safeguards. Data commercial providers presented various common challenges 
such as costs and data quality. Yet, the obstacles and the suggested solutions to 
remove these obstacles differ between trade repositories and credit registers. Cur-
rently, the way of accessing data stored in trade repositories is cumbersome however 
implementation of the EMIR may bring desired convergence in this field. With regard 
to credit registers, the lack of an efficient framework for exchange of information for 
supervisory purposes suggests the need to set up a framework for cooperation between 
the ESRB and EU national central banks and their respective public credit registers 
and, where necessary, with private credit bureaus.
These refinements and others suggested throughout the article will bring the ESRB 
closer to a well-functioning and efficient data collection process. Additionally, ensur-
ing the quality of the data being pooled from the various channels is of essence. In 
order to conduct macro-prudential analysis and produce, when necessary, concrete 
warnings and remedial recommendations, the ESRB information base must include 
comprehensive, comparable, timely and accurate data. The data collection task cannot 
be a one-off exercise. The fast moving and opaque nature of financial markets and 
the constant search for less or non regulated areas dictate the need for adjustment and 
revaluation the ESRB data needs. The ESRB will need to continuously challenge 
information originating from financial institutions to avoid a scenario where the insti-
tutions themselves fail to identify risks being taken. 
Finally, the 2008 financial crisis and the current sovereign debt crisis reaffirm an 
already known fact that systemic risks are a global problem and that their measure-
ment and monitoring must have a global dimension.239 Given this global nature, the 
ESRB’s success will lie in creating an efficient web of information exchanges with 
competent authorities and other institutions outside the EU.
239 Cecchetti, Fender and McGuire (n 74), p 1.
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